

Current History

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MARCH, 1973

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AFRICA, 1973

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Current History

March, 1973

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In this issue, seven articles examine the forces that are shaping the future of Africa. Analyzing American policy towards Africa, our first article points out: "The impression that Africa has suffered from a lack of sufficient American attention is firmly anchored in recent American policy behavior. Now is the opportunity to take a second look, and to rescue that policy from the shadows to which it has been consigned."

Recent United States Policy in Africa

BY W. A. E. SKURNIK

Professor of Political Science, University of Colorado

A TENTATIVE ASSESSMENT of United States policy toward Africa¹ during President Richard Nixon's administration may be hazarded on the basis of public government documents and newspaper accounts. Its most signal feature appears to be a shift from the initial, tentative inclination to continue policies defined by preceding administrations to a subtle but unmistakable "new realism." Some of the more significant events included Mrs. Richard Nixon's symbolic visit to four West African states in January, 1972, the award of nearly half a billion dollars in economic assistance to Portugal, the breach of the United Nations embargo against Rhodesia, the increasing American dependence on Africa—illustrated by the need for Nigerian oil, and by agreements between Ford and General Motors and South African companies for the purchase of platinum to be used in pollution-control devices—and the rising concern of black Americans for this country's Africa policy.

This article attempts to review some of the more important trends apparent in American policy in the past two years. Direct United States assistance programs for Africa can be summarized briefly if only because no great changes affected these programs. American economic assistance to Africa is intended to supplement that of other—primarily European—donors; it represents only about seven per cent of total aid to the continent. The total dollar amount of American economic aid has remained about \$200 million a year (the fiscal year 1973 request was for about

\$216 million), which means an actual decrease as a percentage of GNP and in terms of purchasing power. It is useful also to remember that, as a government spokesman explained to Congress, "most foreign aid does not consist of giving money to other countries," since loans and grants are used chiefly to "buy goods from 4,000 American companies and pay some 1,000 private institutions, firms, and individuals in all 50 states. . . ." Moreover, "American carriers earned about \$78 million in fiscal 1971 transporting AID-financed products to the less developed countries."

American economic aid falls into five broad categories: first, that administered by the Agency for International Development (AID); second, sales and gifts of surplus food, known as the PL-480 program, of which Africa's share for fiscal year 1973 was \$52 million; third, that of the Peace Corps, which spends between \$15 million and \$20 million annually in Africa, Asia and Latin America; fourth, long-term loans by the Export/Import Bank, from which the continent received \$96 million in 1972 (although very little went to sub-Saharan Africa); and fifth, public safety assistance, designed to help train and improve civilian security forces—the bulk of the African total for fiscal 1973 (\$1.2 million) was earmarked for three countries, Ghana, Liberia and Zaire.

AID operates bilateral programs in eight "development emphasis" states (Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Liberia, Nigeria, Tanzania, Uganda and Zaire). These receive the lion's share of AID funds—\$95 million of the total \$153 million budgeted for fiscal 1973; most of the balance goes to regional programs. AID also makes available a self-help fund of between \$50,-

¹ "Africa" refers to the sub-Saharan part of the continent. Unless specified, quotations are from government sources or newspapers.

000 and \$100,000 to African states; in fiscal 1972, 25 countries received an average of \$65,000. AID officials recognize that Africa is the poorest of continents. Of the 25 "least developed" of the world's developing states, 16 are in Africa, many of them landlocked, and half of them with an annual per capita income of \$100 or below. It was partly in recognition of this need that AID recently decided to place a major emphasis on agricultural production, particularly cereals and livestock, and on transportation and education, as well as population and health programs. There is also a greater emphasis on regional programs and multinational donor enterprises, especially in cooperation with the European Development Fund, the World Bank, France and Great Britain.

U.S. MILITARY AID

The pattern of American military assistance to Africa has not changed. Grants remain stable in absolute and relative values. Expenditures for fiscal 1971 were \$13,044,000, and the government requested \$13,316,000 for 1973, or less than 2 per cent of global United States military aid. As in past years, such aid was highly concentrated. Over 90 per cent of the African total (\$12,139,000) was scheduled for Ethiopia, in recognition of the importance of the Kagnew communications installation. Two other countries are to receive fairly substantial amounts: Liberia (\$499,000), because of special historical ties with that country and to help protect a \$375-million private investment; and Zaire (\$455,000), underscoring that state's potential market and influence in Central Africa. Ghana, Mali and Senegal received much smaller amounts, and there was a regional program budgeted at \$93,000. The share of two states was increased over 1972: Ethiopia, by \$3,139,000, of which \$2,630,000 was earmarked for aircraft (presumably sophisticated jets), and Liberia, by \$183,000, of which one-fourth was for unspecified shipping.

The increase in the Defense Department's request over the 1972 fiscal year seems to be unconnected with Africa as such, but rather is the result of a belief that the 1972 congressional cuts had a "severe impact" on this country's defense posture. One indication of the lack of importance of Africa to the United States is the fact that neither the Secretary of Defense, nor Admiral Thomas H. Moorer, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, nor General George M. Seignious, 3d, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs and director of the new Defense Security Assistance Agency, ever mentioned aid to Africa in their testimony before the House Appropriations Committee on their proposals.

² See *The Arms Trade and the Third World* (Stockholm: SIPRI, 1971), ch. 19, "Sub-Saharan Africa."

³ For a discussion of Portugal in Africa, see pp. 106 ff. of this issue.

American military aid to Africa must be understood not merely in terms of absolute dollars; it should be evaluated also against the background of total military aid and defense expenditures in the region. Africa gets most of its military supplies from the former metropolitan powers and from a few smaller independent suppliers, which together account for over two-thirds of arms deliveries. Moreover, the long-term trend in the growth of military expenditures in developing states has been nearly 10 per cent per year, or twice the annual world growth rate. For the continent of Africa, the average annual increase in defense outlays has dropped from 9.6 per cent for the period 1949-1969 to 5 per cent for 1969; during that year, the continent nevertheless spent \$1.2 billion on defense, and 13 sub-Saharan countries spent \$820 million, whereas during fiscal year 1969, the United States provided \$21 million in military aid to Africa (including Morocco and Libya), or less than 3 per cent of these states' total military expenditures.²

AID TO PORTUGAL

A series of agreements reached with Portugal late in 1971 provided an example of apparent wholesale American insensitivity to a world commitment for self-determination. The agreements provided for continued use by American forces of the Lajes Air Base in the Azores in exchange for an unprecedented American economic aid package of nearly half a billion dollars. The package included: (1) the free loan of an oceanographic ship worth \$8 million; (2) a \$1-million grant for educational projects in metropolitan Portugal to be financed by the Defense Department; (3) another grant of a minimum \$5 million representing "initial acquisition cost, not current value," which the Defense Department says includes "road building machinery, cranes, hospitals, port and harbor equipment, soil testing equipment . . .," in other words, precisely the kind of material needed to build hydroelectric dams in Angola and Mozambique; (4) access to a \$15-million loan to purchase surplus United States agricultural commodities; and (5) access to Export/Import Bank loans totaling \$400 million to buy American goods for development projects in Portugal.³

Portugal's present and future value to the defense of the United States and of NATO is a matter for the strategic experts; even granting that it would be worth this investment from the point of view of security considerations, there remains the not inconsiderable question of the wisdom of suddenly showering such wealth on Portugal, given the political contexts of her colonial wars in Africa. The administration certainly seemed motivated solely by defense and economic criteria. The Export/Import Bank, during the period 1946-1970, made under \$50 million available to the nine million people of Portugal, and about \$350 million to 300 million Africans. The size of the new aid

U.S. PRIVATE DIRECT INVESTMENT IN AFRICA*

(Millions of \$ U.S. as of end of year, book value)

Comparison of Africa with Total U.S. Investment Abroad, 1967-70

	1967	1968	1969	1970 Prelim.	1970/67 Percent Change
All Areas	59,486	64,983	71,016	78,090	+ 31.2
Developed Countries	NA	43,500	47,886	53,111	
Developing Countries	NA	18,753	20,045	21,417	
International, Unallocated	NA	2,731	3,085	3,563	
Africa					
Liberia	174	174	172	201	+ 15.5
Libya	451	662	787	1,009	+ 123.7
South Africa	666	696	755	864	+ 29.7
Other Countries (incl. Egypt)	982	1,142	1,267	1,404	+ 43.0
Total**	2,273	2,674	2,982	3,476	+ 52.9
(Total excl. South Africa)	1,607	1,978	2,227	2,612	+ 62.5

Investment by Sector for Selected Years (all Africa)

	1969			1970		
	South Africa	Other Africa	Total Africa	South Africa	Other Africa	Total Africa
Mining & Smelting	84	343	427	90	350	440
Petroleum	158	1,605	1,763	172	1,916	2,088
Manufacturing	373	80	453	438	100	538
Other	140	199	339	163	245	408
Total**	755	2,227	2,982	864	2,612	3,475

* Department of Commerce data. Table from U.S. Department of State Publication 8663, African Series 52, September, 1972.

** Discrepancies in totals are due to rounding.

package to Portugal seems not merely unprecedented and precipitate, but also grossly out of proportion to Portugal's relative political influence.

It should come as no surprise that these agreements were interpreted as a "rescue operation" for economically underdeveloped Portugal and as indirect support for her anachronistic Africa policy. The agreements tend to make a hollow mockery of President Nixon's lofty statement that "I share the conviction that the United States cannot be indifferent to racial policies which violate our national ideals and constitute a direct affront to American citizens." "My administration," he assured the world in 1972, "will not condone recourse to violence . . . as a means of enforcing submission of a majority by a minority. . . ." Over 100,000 Portuguese troops in Angola and Mozambique are doing precisely that, and the American government appears indifferent indeed. It is plausible to suggest that the United States government does not intentionally contribute to continued minority rule by foreigners in Africa. The fact remains, however, that an indirect connection between American security and economic interests and Portuguese rule in Africa is being perceived in this country as well as in Africa.

The Nixon administration, moreover, approved the sale of jetliners to Portugal, subsequently used to ferry troops and matériel to Africa, and of Bell helicopters

reportedly useful for anti-guerrilla operations. The United States government may not be able to control Portugal's use of American military support; but surely it could take into consideration the comparative costs of such support and of its effect on relations with Africa. Charles Diggs, chairman of the House sub-Committee on Africa, found during a recent visit to Africa that:

. . . the Africans regard the Azores agreement as the most significant step of this administration in regard to Africa. They see it as the crux of United States hypocrisy on African issues, as a forthright announcement of United States support for the white minority regimes and a United States decision to jettison United States interests throughout Africa. . . . The damage which the agreement has done and is doing to our interests in Africa is incalculable.

Another effect of the United States government's lower profile and reduced involvement was evident in American policy toward Rhodesia. In this case, a very small segment of the American business community, in cooperation with powerful allies in the United States Senate, partly eviscerated long-standing presidential directives implementing the United Nations Security Council's only call for mandatory economic sanctions against one country. Ironically, the objectives sought—free access to Rhodesian chrome

U.S. TRADE WITH AFRICAN COUNTRIES*					
(Millions of \$ U.S.)					
	1961	1968	1969	1970	1971
<u>Total Africa (excl. Egypt)</u>					
Exports	682	1,202	1,303	1,476	1,607
Imports	635	1,084	1,003	1,081	1,212
Balance	+47	+118	+300	+395	+395
<u>Africa (excl. Egypt & S. Africa)</u>					
Exports	448	746	798	913	985
Imports	425	828	760	793	925
Balance	+23	-82	+38	+120	+60
<u>Principal Trading Partners in 1971</u>					
Country			Exports	Imports	Balance
Rep. of South Africa			622	287	+335
Nigeria			168	130	+38
Morocco			102	7	+95
Zaire			84	43	+41
Algeria			82	20	+62
Libya			78	51	+27
Ghana			55	106	-51
Liberia			43	49	-6
Tunisia			42	5	+37
Kenya			41	26	+15
Zambia			38	7	+31
Angola			36	90	-54
Ethiopia			26	61	-35
Uganda			7	43	-36
Others			183	287	-104
Total			1,607	1,212	+395
<u>Principal Commodity Trade in 1971 and 1970</u>					
Exports	1971	1970	Imports	1971	1970
Capital goods, except automotive	\$804	\$696	Green coffee	\$344	\$340
Automotive vehicles and parts	83	90	Cocoa beans	120	117
Wheat and flour	92	82	Petroleum, crude	160	92
Iron and steel products	45	37	Diamonds, gem	116	71
Newsprint and other paper products	34	33	Rubber, crude	34	41
			Copper	28	36
			Manganese and ferromanganese	39	33

* U.S. State Department Publication 8663, African Series 52, September, 1972.

ore (chromite) and larger profits—have not materialized. The vehicle for the congressionally determined policy change was an amendment to the 1971 military procurement act, introduced by Senator Harry F. Byrd (D., Va.), making it illegal to prevent the importation of strategic materials from a non-Communist country if such materials were being imported from a Communist country. Proponents of the amendment, including the Foote Mining Company of Pennsylvania and Union Carbide, the Liberty Lobby, and a number of dignitaries including former Secretary of State Dean Acheson, argued that Rhodesian chromite is essential to American national security, that it was dangerous to depend on the Soviet Union for chromite imports, that this was a matter of the "free" versus the Communist "world," that the United States government (and particularly the State Depart-

ment) was being subservient to an undemocratic United Nations, that the embargo against Rhodesia was illegal because the Senate had not been consulted prior to the presidential implementation of executive orders, and that it was unfair to heap criticism on the United States because that country was one of only two nations in the world which had not previously violated the embargo.

It must be recognized that the United Nations embargo is a sham; most nations, including many in Africa as well as the People's Republic of China, have violated it, and Rhodesia's chromite industry has been operating at higher than pre-sanction capacity. From a moral perspective, to remain silent about those who have bought Rhodesian chromite and have otherwise disregarded the United Nations sanctions while at the same time mounting a verbal offensive against the

United States for deciding to import one or two commodities is a tactic difficult to swallow, and has repelled many otherwise sympathetic Americans. Chromite—though not necessarily chromite from Rhodesia—is indeed vital to national security, but the situation is far from critical. The United States imports currently about 900,000 tons of chromite annually, of which only ten per cent is needed for defense purposes, 90 per cent going to the automobile and allied industries. Moreover, the administration has recommended that Congress authorize the disposal of 1.3 million tons of excess stock over a three-year period. In light of the economic rapprochement between America and the Soviet Union, and of plans for United States dependence on Siberian natural gas, the “danger” of dependence on that Communist country for chromite is not apparent. What was really at issue were narrow commercial interests. As David Newsom, Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, put it to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee:

This proposal [the Byrd amendment] is contrary to United States policy interests. It would while providing relief for one commodity—a commodity for which, I might add, relief can be justified not on the basis of national security interests but on the basis of relative price considerations—call into serious question our will to fulfill our international obligations.

The Rhodesian government, though elated at the Byrd amendment's passage, declared that it would remain faithful to its loyal customers, i.e., those who bought chromite despite United Nations sanctions. At the end of 1972, only two shipments with a total of 56,000 tons of ore (about 2 per cent of Rhodesia's production) had reached the United States, and one of them had to be unloaded under police protection. In assessing American policy, a small profit and the joys of professional anti-communism must be weighed against the political costs. Given the social, economic and political conditions in Rhodesia, this is a highly charged issue of racism and colonialism with which the United States was bound to become identified once it elected to break the sanctions. The strongest nation, taking pride in its democratic ideals, stood as a cold, calculating bully without the semblance of sympathy for the misery of Third World peoples.

It should be noted that the decentralized American foreign policy-making process played its part in these events. President Nixon had publicly opposed the Byrd amendment prior to—but only prior to—its passage. The Secretary of the Treasury seized the opportunity of passage to remove several other minerals from the general ban on imports from Rhodesia. The State Department remained staunchly opposed to breaking the embargo, but without practical effect so far. High-ranking State Department officials at first lobbied in Congress for the defeat of Senator Byrd

and his friends. In May, 1972, they persuaded Senator Gale McGee (D., Wyo.) to sponsor a move to annul the Byrd amendment. That move failed by a mere four votes. Senator McGee later complained that the White House, from which a telephone call to some half dozen Senators would have lined up six supporters for McGee, refused to contact anyone; an angry McGee declared that the White House paid only lip service to the issue, and wanted “a crumb to toss to the right wingers.” Whether or not this was a correct reading of top administration intentions, the blot on the American image abroad was enlarged.

THE INFLUENCE OF BLACK AMERICANS

One of the most potentially interesting and consequential developments was the emergence of elements of the black American community as a pressure group concerned with United States relations with Africa. This was illustrated by a number of meetings and demonstrations which took place in 1972. In February, 27 prominent black American leaders met in Puerto Rico and agreed to coordinate and support further activities. That same month, the Congressional Black Caucus, a group of 13 Democratic representatives convened several years earlier by Representative Charles Diggs, elected Louis Stokes of Ohio as its new chairman and thus signaled a more aggressive stance. The first National Black Political Convention held at Gary, Indiana, in March, listed a number of demands with regard to United States policy toward Africa. In April, a Black Scholars Conference convened in Austin, Texas. By far the most spectacular event was the African Liberation Day demonstration in Washington, D.C., on May 27. Over 10,000 people, mostly black, gathered for a peaceful march on southern African and Portuguese diplomatic offices and on the State Department. The demonstration, which focused criticism on American policy toward southern Africa, was preceded by a smaller conference at Howard University.

It is much too early to assess the overall impact which the black American community can have on United States foreign relations. On the surface, it seems that black Americans are not yet well organized, and hence they are relatively ineffective, subject to uncoordinated individual decisions, profound disagreements and a palpable lack of unity. Black con-

(Continued on page 135)

Before joining the faculty at the University of Colorado, Walter Skurnik was an assistant professor of political science at Pennsylvania Military College from 1963 to 1965. He is a frequent contributor to journals on African affairs and is the author of “The Military in Dahomey,” in Claude E. Welch (ed.), *Soldier and State in Africa* (Evanston: Northwestern University

"Whether the present government of South Africa will get its way, creating a host of small, weak, helpless African-led client areas, overwhelmingly dependent on the Republic, remains to be seen."

South Africa: The White Laager

BY CHRISTIAN P. POTHOLM

Associate Professor of Government and Legal Studies, Bowdoin College

SOUTH AFRICA CONTINUES to command the spotlight of the world's attention as scholars, businessmen, diplomats, students and churchmen attempt to grapple with her complexities and the future implications of her racial politics.¹ Moreover, the last few years have indicated that South Africa is not alone, but instead stands at the hub of a recognizable international subsystem, dominating as she does Africa south of the Zambezi River and casting a long military and economic shadow over her neighbors in Zimbabwe (Rhodesia), Namibia (Southwest Africa), Lesotho, Swaziland, Botswana and Malawi.² In addition, she helps to bolster the Portuguese presence in Angola and Mozambique. Thus, events and trends in South Africa are not only important unto themselves but are of considerable consequence for all of Africa and indeed for international relations generally. It is the purpose of this article to examine the current scene in South Africa in order to set contemporary events within the context of the past and the perspective of the future, to determine how much is flux and how much is fallow in this, the most important white *laager*, or bastion, in Africa.

The South African government continues to follow its stated course of apartheid, or separateness, and is systematically dividing the territory of the country into European, Asian, Colored and African areas, with the African territory in turn being subdivided into tribal "homelands," or bantustans. During the past several years, this process has intensified and by the end of 1973 there will be eight functioning bantustans scheduled for self-government. These range in size and scope from the Switzerland-sized Transkei,

led by Chief Kaiser Matanzima and peopled by the Khosa tribe, to the home of the Zulus, Kwazulua, with its newly installed Chief Gatsha Buthelezi, which consists of 29 large chunks of territory and 150 smaller ones, to the more fragmented Tswana homeland, Bophutatswana, headed by Chief Lucas Mangope. In Namibia, the South African government continues, despite United Nations opposition, to implement its Odendaal plan, which will separate the territory into nine African homelands, Kaokoland, Ovamboland, Damaraland, Kavangoland, Boesmanland, Hereroland, Basterland, Tswanaland and Namaland. What does this fragmentation signify? Where is South Africa heading as a result of this territorial subdivision?

In the first place, the resulting mosaic is geographically, economically and demographically absurd. It is also manifestly unfair. The Europeans of South Africa, who comprise only 20 per cent of the population, end up with 87 per cent of the land, including the richest and most valuable. The 15 million Africans find themselves with a scant 13 per cent of the land, much of it so poor in quality that in most of the bantustans, no more than 15 per cent of the population are able to earn their livelihood there. Most Africans must in fact work in the "white areas," where they have no political or economic rights, where they are simply units of labor. Thus the bantustans have already become the dumping grounds for the old, the infirm and the children. Most healthy wage earners are found in white areas, and the government's stated objective of locating "border industries" in white areas adjacent to the various bantustans has not been pursued with any vigor whatsoever. Moreover, African demands for more land continue to fall on deaf ears. In 1971, when he was notified that the Africans were concerned about the amount of land they received and were asking for more, South Africa's Minister of Bantu Administration, M.C. Botha, is reported to have said, "They don't know what to do with what they've already got." He also blamed

¹ For an overview of the current scholarly literature dealing with South Africa, see C. P. Potholm, "After Many a Summer? The Possibilities of Political Change in South Africa," *World Politics*, Vol. XXIV, no. 4 (July, 1972), pp. 613-638.

² A comprehensive analysis of the entire area by African, American and European scholars is contained in Richard Dale and C. P. Potholm (eds.), *Southern Africa in Perspective: Essays in Regional Politics* (New York: The Free Press, 1972).

"outsiders" for causing difficulties in the reserves.

But while the bantustans are territorially inadequate, hopelessly fragmented and economically unviable, they are enormously useful as political insulation. In the South African scheme of things, they represent the most important method of denying the Africans any say in decision-making at the national level while giving the appearance of political importance to the bantustans. Since all Africans have been assigned to their own homelands, and have been given political rights in these reserves, then it follows that they have no need for political participation in the national life of South Africa. Thus, however weak and impotent the bantustans, they give the semblance of African opportunity and, by forcing the Africans into tribal political groups, stave off any future national coalescence of Africans. At least that is what most white South Africans hope. The government feels that by this method, the African revolution can be put off indefinitely, and that the very nature of the political structures within the bantustans, with their emphasis on traditional African political authorities, will insure docile local leadership and develop a class of Africans beholden to the central, European-run government. Although this process has been rightly labeled the politics of "domestic colonialism," it does seem to have at least limited appeal to some Africans, who feel that half a loaf is better than none.³

Whether the present government of South Africa will get its way, creating a host of small, weak, helpless, African-led client areas, overwhelmingly dependent on the Republic, remains to be seen. Certainly some observers have argued that the bantustan program carries within it its own seeds of destruction and that, eventually, the African leadership, by an as yet undefined process, will challenge the political hegemony of white South Africa.⁴ Others have felt that the increasing fragmentation of South Africa will reduce the zero-sum quality about South African politics and may eventually lead to a true race federation in the area, a kind of partnership for development.⁵ It is interesting that so little has been written

and said about what the terminal community of apartheid will look like. It may well be that the present leaders of South Africa do not know themselves where this is all leading. But for the present it seems clear that they are not prepared to jeopardize the core values of European hegemony and racial separation.

THE TRIBAL LEADERS

For their part, the leaders of the two most prominent bantustans, Kaiser Matanzima and Gatsha Buthelezi, have recently indicated that although they oppose apartheid and fully recognize the extent of their dependence on South Africa, they are anxious to push the government for further prerogatives. Matanzima has gone on record as advocating one black nation, an eventual merger of all the bantustans in South Africa to create a single, black-ruled, independent state. Already he has called for an initial federation between the Transkei and the nearby Ciskei, proposing that the new entity (to be called Khosaland) in turn would be the prelude to an eventual merger with Kwazulua. Gatsha Buthelezi has also indicated that he would like to see an eventual merger, but for the moment he is most anxious to use the bantustan concept in ways it was never intended. During 1972, for example, he suggested that future foreign aid should come directly into the homeland instead of passing through the South African government. Since he clearly had United States aid in mind, the speed of South Africa's negative response was instructive, although Buthelezi was not discouraged, for he has made up his mind to press for the betterment of his people, regardless of South African intentions.⁶

In many ways, it is most ironic that in South Africa today, it is those tribal leaders who were so widely accused of conservatism and collaboration in the 1950's and 1960's who are now seeking substantial change in the relationship between their people and the government of South Africa. The leaders who led the struggle for national political power in the two decades just past have all been arrested or confined to specific locations or have gone into exile. Whatever their impact on the past and future of the republic, their present influence is severely limited, and those who would look for African-sponsored change in South Africa would do well to consider the emerging leaders of the bantustans as potential agents for change.⁷

ECONOMIC CHANGES

In addition to the rising level of political activity within the various bantustans, there are other changes within South Africa which some observers have heralded as important portents of things to come. Wages for non-Europeans are rising, and some foreign

³ Gwendolyn M. Carter, Thomas Karis and Newell Stultz, *South Africa's Transkei: The Politics of Domestic Colonialism* (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1967).

⁴ Heribert Adam, *Modernizing Racial Domination: The Dynamics of South African Politics* (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1971). See also his edited work, *South Africa: Sociological Perspectives* (London: Oxford University Press, 1970).

⁵ Leo Marquard, *A Federation of Southern Africa* (London: Oxford University Press, 1971).

⁶ For a fascinating perspective on his thinking, see Gatsha Buthelezi, *The Past and Future of the Zulu People* (Los Angeles: Munger African Library Note, 1972).

⁷ For a particularly devastating critique of exile leadership and goals, see Richard Gibson, *African Liberation Movements: Contemporary Struggles Against White Minority Rule* (London: Oxford University Press, 1972). Although Gibson has been castigated in some circles for lacking the proper revolutionary attitude, his criticism of many of the movements in Southern Africa is difficult to refute.

firms, like Polaroid, have indicated a willingness to raise these wages even further. Some South African labor unions have even called for additional income improvement for Africans (although they stopped far short of advocating parity). These developments could be construed as meaning that apartheid is breaking down under the pressure of the market place, and that these economic advances may eventually lead to an improvement in the political situation of the non-European.

There can be no question that there is a labor shortage in South Africa. It is commonly admitted that many jobs technically reserved for Europeans are in fact occupied by Africans, Asians and Coloreds. Wages for non-Europeans have also risen. But one must be very careful about attaching great political significance to either of these trends. In the first place, as the recent report of the South African Council of Churches' Christian Institute study group indicates, while non-European wages have risen, the gap between the wages paid to Europeans and to non-Europeans has actually widened during the past decade.⁸

In addition, any further amelioration of the economic plight of the non-European actually bolsters the existing political system by offering an economic safety valve. As long as the ceiling over African advancement is raised, as long as there is the prospect of relative upward mobility, the system will continue to have a strong distributive capability at its disposal. What this improvement is likely to bring, then, is (1) an increase in the number of Africans committed to the status quo, and (2) a corresponding rise in the floor under European economic life. In short, although Africans will gain economically, they will not pass even the lower echelons of Europeans, nor will African economic advances be translated into political change because of the ability of the bantustan program to deflect increasing demand pressures away from the political center.

Another development has to do with the continuing agitation on the part of the leaders of the National Union of South African Students. Made up of many English-speaking students, this group has, for a number of years, advocated a loosening up of apartheid and greater economic, political and social power for non-Europeans, particularly Africans. During 1972, the police used tear gas and baton charges to break up some demonstrations of NUSAS. Some foreign observers were quick to see this as a harbinger of the

revolution to come. Yet the NUSAS protests must be seen for what they are: small, isolated, non-revolutionary demonstrations, easily dispersed by the government's security apparatus. Moreover, the ability of this organization to generate student support remains open to serious question.⁹

Perhaps the only significant indication that political consciousness is rising is the hesitant sign that some non-Europeans, or at least some young non-Europeans, are refusing, for the first time, to be put in the apartheid mold, to be set against one another. The 1972 Black People's Convention brought together Asians, Coloreds and Africans, and the central theme of the meeting was: "we are all black." While the movement is very much in its embryo stage, it could have a future impact on the system if it were to grow and if its ethos were to become dominant among non-Europeans. The present government of South Africa has been very effective in separating non-Europeans into racial groups, playing off one against the others and working to insure that they do not coalesce against the government. This policy has been successful because the bulk of all three communities have seen themselves as distinct and, in the case of Asians and Coloreds, as superior to the Africans. However incremental the advantages the first two groups enjoyed vis-à-vis Africans, they have been regarded as important. Were the black power movement to catch on in South Africa—and there is no clear evidence that it will—it could pose a challenge to existing white hegemony. It is one aspect of the situation which bears close watching.


SOUTH AFRICA'S NEIGHBORS

South Africa's relations with the other units in the Southern African subsystem have witnessed some important developments in the past several years. In Namibia, the government has continued to carry out its plan to divide the territory and its 700,000 inhabitants into tribal groupings. This has been done in spite of United Nations opposition to the plan and assertions that South Africa has no business administering the territory at all. At the same time, the United Nations has stopped short of accepting the claim of the South West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO) that it is in fact the legal administrative body for Namibia. United Nations Secretary General Kurt Waldheim visited the area in 1972 and concluded an agreement with South Africa whereby the government promised to let United Nations representatives periodically visit Namibia. This was initially hailed at the United Nations as a "foot in the door," but in 1973, the pressure will be on the Secretary General to gain more concessions from the republic as South Africa continues to forge ahead with the dismemberment of the territory.

South Africa's most immediate neighbors, the for-

⁸ For an overview of the economic, social and psychological impact of apartheid, the interested reader should consult United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, *Apartheid* (Paris: UNESCO, 1972).

⁹ Martin Legassick, *The National Union of South African Students: Ethnic Cleavage and Ethnic Integration in the Universities* (Los Angeles: Occasional Paper #4, African Studies Center, University of California, 1967).



mer High Commission territories of Lesotho, Botswana and Swaziland, are important to the present regime, because they are weak, economically dependent areas whose governments are, to a certain extent at least, dependent upon the republic. Relations with these areas may well indicate the course of future relations between South Africa and the emerging bantustans. In Lesotho, there has been a continuing policy of national reconciliation, as the government of Prime Minister Leabua Jonathan and his ruling Basutoland National party have sought to integrate some of their political opponents into the national life of the country. Following the coup in 1970, in which Chief Jonathan lost the election to the Basutoland Congress party and its leader, Ntsu Mokhehle, Lesotho has

seemed disturbed by her image as a South African client state, and the government has sought to replace South African technical personnel with Americans. In addition, during 1972, relations were strained further when Lesotho's Ambassador to the United Nations, Mooki Molape, claimed that relations with

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"Caught between advancing African nationalism and growing South African intervention, Portugal can no longer count on a growing stay in Africa. As Lisbon's authority ebbs and its attention is drawn to Europe, the colonies will become independent. Much less certain is the form independence will take."

Portugal's Changing Fortunes in Africa

BY THOMAS H. HENRIKSEN

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DESPITE THE SEEMINGLY ENDLESS conflicts in Portugal's African territories, events of the last two years cast doubt on Lisbon's willingness and ability to continue to carry on three wars. The length of the struggles and the relatively small-scale operations of the African guerrillas have influenced dispassionate observers to envision a period of indefinite deadlock. True, more than ten years of lingering guerrilla warfare and many unfulfilled predictions by both observers and participants should warn against hasty judgments. But ill-appreciated changes in southern Africa, metropolitan Portugal and Great Power involvement militate against continued stalemate between Lisbon and the nationalists of Angola, Mozambique and Guinea-Bissau. Indeed, the shift in the balance of political and military forces suggests the passing of a formidable point of no return for Lisbon's centuries-old presence in Africa.

Portugal inaugurated the European colonization of Africa. Beginning in the early fifteenth century, Prince Henry's explorers pioneered sea routes down the Atlantic coast of Africa in search of oriental riches and imperial glory. Until less than 100 years ago, however, Portuguese control rested on the African littoral, and the Portuguese used its ports as sources of slaves or way stations to the east. Spurred by the general European scramble for Africa at the end of the nineteenth century, Portuguese explorers and campaigners advanced into the Angolan and Mozambican hinterland. Although Portuguese occupation of the interior regions met fierce resistance at the turn of this century, Lisbon witnessed no serious threat to its rule until the 1960's. But the winds of African nationalism that swept Britain, France and Belgium from their African colonies braced Portugal's

determination to weather the storm. Instead of preparing colonies for independence, in 1951 Lisbon termed Angola, Mozambique and Guinea-Bissau overseas provinces of Portugal. Soon after, Portugal initiated plans to integrate her African dependencies—20 times the size of Portugal and twice the population—into the economy and administration of the metropole. Pitting the dream of a Lusitanian Africa against nationalist aspirations of independence, Lisbon policy-makers placed their forces in conflict with those of the guerrilla movements.

AFRICAN RESISTANCE

The first of the three insurgencies began in January, 1961, with a poorly planned rebellion in northern Angola. This initial outbreak of violence was followed by a series of spontaneous upheavals that plunged Angola into protracted unrest. Switching from conventional to guerrilla tactics, the UPA (Union of Angolan Peoples) established strongholds in the nearly impenetrable bush of the northeastern quarter of the country. While the level of fighting declined, the UPA changed its name the following April to the Angolan Revolutionary Government in Exile (GRAE) in the hope of gaining international recognition.¹ In 1966, first the MPLA (People's Liberation Movement of Angola) and then UNITA (National Union for the Total Independence of Angola) opened fronts in eastern Angola. But in spite of a gradual increase in guerrilla strength and foreign assistance, the Angolan nationalists remain fragmented in rival movements, the differences running in some instances along ethnic as well as ideological lines.

Insurgency inevitably spread to Portugal's other African territories. In Guinea-Bissau, a thin wedge of territory on the west coast between Senegal and the Republic of Guinea, the PAIGC (African Independence Party for Guinea and Cape Verde) spearheaded the drive for independence by assaulting Portuguese military outposts in the last months of 1962.

¹ John Marcum, *The Angolan Revolution: The Anatomy of an Explosion, 1950-1962*, Vol. I (Cambridge: Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1969), is the most authoritative account of the revolt.

Since Guinea-Bissau has neither a significant settler population (there are about 2,000 European immigrants) nor mineral wealth, Portugal's commitment there is psychological and symbolic. Guinea-Bissau's loss would be viewed by both sides as the first in a row of falling dominoes.

The Mozambique Liberation Front (FRELIMO) launched the military phase of its revolution in the northern districts of Niassa and Cabo Delgado in September, 1964. Under the late Eduardo Mondlane, FRELIMO penetrated into Mozambique, while promoting limited social and educational services for the inhabitants in rebel-held areas. Mondlane's death by assassination in early 1969 temporarily hampered the southward thrust of FRELIMO guerrillas until Samora Machel, one of the members of the triumvirate, assumed the FRELIMO presidency a year later. Since then Machel, who was Mondlane's military commander, has attempted to cripple the construction of the internationally financed Cahora Bassa dam on the Zambezi River.²

By 1971, the nationalist challenge to Portuguese rule was ten years old with no apparent end in sight. In each territory the African nationalists had made inroads along the frontiers, gaining control in remote areas. Portuguese tactics had become defensive with the goal of containing the insurgency in thinly populated regions lacking natural wealth or strategic value. Outside the disturbed zones life went on much as usual, but limiting guerrilla advances tied down an army of 140,000 men. Mistakenly, many observers have concluded that an unchanging balance has been struck between the incumbent and insurgent, and they have ruled out the introduction of new participants or variations in the existing lineups. As they see it, a classic case of siege warfare has taken shape.³

THE BALANCE SHIFTED

Events since early 1971 should radically alter any assessment of a changeless standoff. In Africa, the nationalists have attacked some of Portugal's securest preserves. During the summer of 1971, FRELIMO not only raised the level of fighting but also shifted tactics from direct assaults on the Cahora Bassa dam and settlement scheme to severing supply routes and isolating the pro-South African country of Malawi from its mentor. Faced with the absence of vegetation for concealment and with protective rings of Portuguese crack troops surrounding the dam, FRELIMO turned with success to ambushing and mining the

dam's approaches. When completed in 1975, this project will be the largest source of hydroelectric power in the continent.

The threat to Cahora Bassa has been serious enough to prompt the governments in Rhodesia and South Africa to survey with alarm the situation in the Tete district. Government leaders in Pretoria and Salisbury privately express their lack of faith in the Portuguese ability to contain the guerrilla movements within Mozambican borders. Although FRELIMO's raids will probably not halt construction, they insure that South Africa, which is to get the lion's share of electricity, cannot contemplate a trouble-free source of power without greater intervention in Mozambique.

FRELIMO's intensified activity in Tete has also embroiled the neighboring state of Malawi, whose leader, Kamuzu Banda, pursues a strongly pro-South African policy. Surrounded on three sides by African governments hostile to Pretoria, Malawi's only road connection with South Africa runs through Mozambique to white-ruled Rhodesia. By frequently slashing the Malawi-Rhodesia link, FRELIMO has virtually blocked South Africa from effectively aiding her client state and might spur anti-Banda elements within and without Malawi to take the offensive. Such groups could coalesce around the exiled former minister, Henry Chipembere, who is now in Tanzania. But even if South African-airlifted arms prolong Banda's rule, Malawi is expected to change radically, after the death of her septuagenarian President. Like a dagger in the midsection of Mozambique, Malawi provides a point of thrust for southward guerrilla penetration.

That the new tempo of guerrilla activity caused concern in Lisbon and Pretoria was underscored by the unpublicized visits of General Kaulza de Arriaga, Mozambique's commander-in-chief, to South Africa in the last two years. Nearly as significant, the closing of the road is blamed for the 23 per cent decline in Malawi's tourist receipts during the summer of 1971 over a comparable period the previous year. The conclusion seems inescapable that Mozambique must be defended if South Africa is to avoid a hostile state on her border, cutting off Rhodesia from the Indian Ocean.

Angola has presented the least pressing problem for Portugal since the 1961 uprising. Lisbon has benefitted from the internecine conflicts within and between exiled parties, and President Mobutu's expulsion of MPLA and UNITA bases from Zaire (Congo-Kinshasa). Operating from sanctuaries in Zambia, the MPLA and UNITA guerrillas have had to exercise caution in disrupting eastern Angola because the Zambian economy relies on copper, which is freighted on the Benguela railway across Angola to the Atlantic coast. As a warning, in 1967 the Portuguese briefly

² For more information, the reader can consult the special issues devoted to the wars in *Africa Report*, Vol. 12, No. 8 (November, 1967), and Vol. 15, No. 5 (May, 1970).

³ For representative accounts, see George Martelli, "Conflict in Portuguese Africa," in *Portuguese Africa: A Handbook*, eds., David M. Abshire and Michael A. Samuels (New York: Praeger, 1969), p. 429; *The New York Times*, June 7, 1971; *Toronto Globe and Mail*, January 10, 1971.

closed the Benguela railway to copper shipments from Zaire and Zambia. With the completion in 1975 of the Chinese-financed railroad linking the copper mines of Zambia with the Tanzanian port of Dar es Salaam, the guerrillas will almost certainly be less restrained in their attacks.

Another cause for anxiety in Portugal is the MPLA's announcement in February, 1972, that it would open a new front in southern Angola to obstruct the construction of the giant power and irrigation scheme on the Cunene River, which forms part of the boundary separating Angola from the South African-controlled territory of Namibia (South West Africa). Lisbon and Pretoria planned and invested in the Cunena project not only as an economic enterprise but also as means of reinforcing control in the frontier region.

According to its communiqués, the MPLA also plans to organize the restive Ovambo people who straddle the Angolan-Namibian border against the white-ruled governments. At the end of 1971 about 13,000 Ovambos—one-third of the labor force in Namibia—walked off their jobs at the white-owned mining, fishing and industrial enterprises in order to gain higher wages and better terms. After the shooting of strikers, Ovambo representatives met with South African authorities and agreed to a settlement, but considerable dissatisfaction remains over the agreement and the deaths of 10 workers. The MPLA hopes to spread the conflict into southern Angola and northern Namibia, and to involve South African counterinsurgency units on a scale in Angolan territory wider than the present use of aerial intelligence and border surveillance teams.

Of all Portugal's colonies, Guinea-Bissau is believed to be closest to defeating Portuguese rule. Long regarded as Africa's most successful revolutionary movement, the PAIGC has steadily extended its control from the interior to the coast and from the south to the north. On occasion, it has brought under mortar and rocket fire the capital city of Bissau and its nearby airport of Bissalanca. In the countryside, many of the Portuguese garrisons exist as enclaves surrounded by PAIGC-controlled territory and rely almost exclusively on air transport for supply. Having assumed a defensive posture, Portuguese forces limit their efforts to perimeter patrols and air strikes.

Until recently, Portugal enjoyed complete freedom of aerial movement, but this has been defied from an unexpected quarter. Beginning in 1971, Nigerian pilots flying Conakry-based, Russian-supplied MIG 17 aircraft have violated Guinea-Bissau's airspace. Nigerian actions are partly explainable as a retaliatory measure for Portuguese aid to the Biafran secessionists during the civil war that divided Nigeria in the

late 1960's. Apart from revenge, a reunited and oil-rich Nigeria is expected to play a greater role in African affairs. General Yakubu Gowon, the Nigerian head of state, has pledged increased support to nationalist forces and has remarked that black Africa should unite to free Guinea-Bissau from colonial rule at the earliest possible date. The energetic participation of Nigeria in an anti-Portuguese coalition would swell in terms of power the thin ranks of African states (Algeria, Tanzania and Zambia) actively engaged in supplying funds and technical assistance to guerrilla movements. Even the long ineffectual Liberation Committee of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) has declared a 10 per cent raise in financial assistance to nationalist movements.

There is another foreign intrusion that foreshadows a distinct change in Portuguese fortunes; Russian ships now protect the PAIGC's sanctuary in the neighboring Republic of Guinea. By stationing a constant naval combat presence in Guinean waters, the Soviet Union safeguards Conakry against a repetition of the Portuguese amphibious raid of November, 1970. Judging by Moscow's manipulation of the Indo-Pakistani war to its advantage, it is not unlikely that the Soviet Union could thwart Portugal's war effort and embarrass her NATO allies by dealing the Portuguese a deft blow in Africa below the Tropic of Cancer and beyond the defense commitments of the Atlantic alliance. The possibility of such Soviet action is reportedly the concern of some Washington analysts.

Indeed, events within Guinea-Bissau increase the likelihood of more foreign aid to the PAIGC. Under the leadership of Amílcar Cabral,* the guerrillas were organizing elections and forming a government that was expected to seek international recognition. Following the lead of African states, the Soviet Union as well as other nations could grant recognition to such a government. Thereafter, Soviet ships and airplanes supplied under the auspices of the OAU could soon end Portugal's sea and air superiority. As the champion of anti-colonial movements, the Soviet Union can enhance its image in sub-Saharan Africa, where China is achieving a strong lead.

Of less immediate consequence for Portuguese rule in Mozambique and Angola is the Soviet naval build-up in the Indian Ocean and southern Atlantic. Lacking sufficient strength for a blockade of southern Africa, the Soviet Union can afford no greater risk at present than furnishing arms to the guerrillas. But Lisbon's weakness in austral Africa and Soviet combat ships in adjacent waters can induce the staunchly anti-Communist South African regime to entrench itself further in the vacuum of waning Portuguese power.

Portugal's ebbing strength is evidenced by recent

* *Editor's note:* Amílcar Cabral was assassinated on January 20, 1973.

changes in her economic relations with the African provinces. Lisbon announced early in 1972 that it would no longer bear the burden of developing colonies and instituted a new payment system, placing Portugal on virtually the same footing with regard to the colonies as a foreign country. Henceforth, Angola and Mozambique will pay for Portuguese goods and services in metropolitan escudos or foreign currency and not in territorial escudos. Under the previous payment scheme, Angola and Mozambique had been running increasingly large balance-of-payments deficits with Portugal. By the end of 1971, the net outstanding debits of Angola and Mozambique had reached 10 billion escudos (\$367 million), or 5 per cent of metropolitan Portugal's annual GNP. The new measures establish strict control over the territories' expenditures with the metropole and, if the controls are effectively applied and maintained, will eliminate the classic colonial economic ties between Lisbon and Africa.

The implications of the new payment mechanism are far-reaching. By equating Portugal with foreign nations as far as the colonies are concerned, Lisbon jettisoned the plan of the former Premier, the late António de Oliveira Salazar, who advocated economic integration of the overseas provinces and the metropole (in 1963). An inevitable consequence of the economic curbs will be increased trade between the Portuguese territories and Rhodesia and South Africa. Bit by bit, Angola and Mozambique will be pushed into tighter economic integration with white southern Africa. Metropolitan exporters of wine, textiles and leather goods will not only lose important privileged markets in Africa by the economic reforms, but Angola and Mozambique can also be expected to evolve toward greater independence. The termination of the economic dividends of Portuguese rule is heightening the European settlers' opposition to Lisbon's continued suzerainty.

One important settler frustration stems from Lisbon's conviction that to remain in Africa it must initiate social and educational reforms, to win African loyalty and end some injustices to Africans which led to the insurgencies. But the educational reforms that aim to transform the African into a black Portuguese also create competitors for jobs usually held by whites. Since the upheavals, foreign investment and expanded educational opportunities for Africans are at last bringing Angola and Mozambique into the twentieth century, but they also contribute to developing African social and political awareness. While settler groups applaud changes that

benefit them, they are apprehensive that educated Africans will prove to be future competitors, if not future subversives.⁴

Lisbon faces potential rebels à la Rhodesia within the ranks of European settlers (250,000 in Angola and 150,000 in Mozambique). White home-rule groups in both Angola and Mozambique have demanded wider local autonomy. In answer to mounting pressure, Lisbon recently implemented the 1971 constitutional reforms allowing for a slight loosening of ties between Lisbon and the provinces. The designation of Angola and Mozambique as "states" with small elective assemblies indicates a departure from the Salazarist policy of economic and political integration. Yet Lisbon may have to move even faster than it anticipates to placate the settlers' growing frustration as it obliges them to shoulder an even larger share of the counterinsurgency costs.⁵

As Lisbon's economic curbs will invariably expand trade between Portuguese territories and South Africa and Rhodesia, so they will also lead settlers in Angola and Mozambique to depend on security from kindred European governments in the continent's southern region. Even without mutual trading interests, the shared history of racial and economic conflicts with the African majority unites the white minority governments. South Africa's military strength to resist African nationalism also acts as a powerful lodestone to the weaker white regimes of the north. When power accumulates in the hands of the settler governments, they can be expected to look to Pretoria while asserting independence from Lisbon.

PERSURES WITHIN PORTUGAL

Outside Africa, strong pressures confront Lisbon to withdraw from its dependencies. In Portugal, there is a deepening disenchantment at many levels of society with continuing three rear-guard colonial wars. Spending upwards of 40 per cent of her national budget to equip and maintain a far-flung expeditionary force, Portugal lacks capital for industrial and agricultural modernization. Social and educational reforms unsuccessfully vie for funds with wars thousands of miles away. Because of Portugal's underdevelopment, every year an estimated 100,000 Portuguese illegally cross the frontier in search of higher paying jobs in France and Germany or to avoid the military draft. In addition to critically lowering the population to 8.6 million, the emigrants take with them badly needed skills. This drain is aggravated by the government's policy of encouraging—by grants of free land and transportation—about 5,000 Portuguese to settle annually in Angola and Mozambique as a means of holding the colonies. To offset a dwindling population, the government directed the importation of 15,000 Cape Verdian workers during 1971 to provide unskilled labor.

⁴ For a more complete treatment of this point, see Douglas Wheeler and René Pélissier, *Angola* (New York: Praeger, 1971), pp. 247-49.

⁵ In 1967, the African territories bore 29 per cent of the military expenditures and in 1970 they contributed 47 per cent. UN, Doc. A/8023/Add. 4, p. 41.

This stopgap measure, in turn, could disrupt Portuguese society by introducing racial strife in a country at war with Africans.

The heavy population drain points up one of the inherent weaknesses in Portugal's ability to wage war indefinitely. The Achilles' heel of Portugal's retention of Africa is manpower, although African troops have been recruited in large numbers. Without an adequate population, Lisbon can neither maintain an effective military machine nor settle sufficient immigrants to hang on to Africa. Six thousand battle deaths, although relatively modest by modern warfare standards, represent a serious hemorrhage for tiny Portugal, especially when combined with nearly one million Portuguese emigrants living throughout Europe.

Just as West Europe attracts Portuguese emigrants, it also draws Portugal toward economic integration. Spurred by a modern vision of Portugal, a new generation of economists works for associate membership in the Common Market to break the stultifying economic isolation of the Iberian peninsula. Opposed to a Europe-first orientation are the armed service officers, ultra-right politicians and businessmen with African investments who correctly view Lisbon's participation in the European Economic Community as a weakening of the tie with Africa and as an opportunity for European governments to scrutinize Portugal's overseas policies. Currently, Portugal is embroiled in diplomatic wrangles with Denmark, Norway and the Netherlands over their aid to African nationalist forces, and the Danes have disclosed that they will actively support moves to dislodge Portugal from NATO. Yet the pressure to join the EEC will intensify as Portugal's partners in the European Free Trade Association seek membership, leaving the Portuguese isolated from the prosperity of an economically united Europe. In these circumstances, Portuguese ruling circles have begun to polarize over the question of remaining in Africa.

Active opposition to the African wars outside the ruling stratum has made its appearance in the form of a disciplined and effective urban underground movement, the Armed Revolutionary Action (ARA), which advocates social and political reform in Portugal and African independence for the colonies. In the spring of 1971, the ARA launched a widespread campaign of sabotage which has had singular and dramatic success in puncturing Portugal's authoritarian tranquility, with blown-up ships and airplanes, dis-

rupted communication centers and damaged NATO installations. Frequent police raids and numerous arrests have failed to subdue the clandestine opposition. As a result of subversive activity, government officials speak of the *real* enemy being at home, and in November, 1971, Premier Marcello Caetano, Salazar's successor, asked the National Assembly to declare a "state of subversion," thus empowering the government to deal severely with its critics.

Recurrent in this atmosphere of political instability, war weariness and attempts to reorient national policy, speculation turns on the likelihood of a military coup approved by the ultra-right. A regime of Brazilian generals or Greek colonels would be a heavy blow to the forces of African nationalism and domestic reform while inviting acute civil strife, which has been absent from Portugal since the days of the Republic (1910-1926). The continuation of the wars can be expected to deepen the cleavages that have developed since 1971.

This said, it should be acknowledged that powerful countervailing forces exist which theoretically could enable Portugal to avert domestic turmoil and defend her presence in Africa. The new American-Portuguese Azores agreement is an unexpected element in Lisbon's favor. Prior to this executive agreement of December, 1971, the United States operated air and naval facilities on the mid-Atlantic islands for a nine-year period on an *ad hoc* basis without a lease.⁶

Unlike the previous arrangement, President Richard Nixon's accord renders substantial development aid to Portugal for only a 25-month lease.⁷ Apart from a grant of \$1 million for education, free use of an oceanographic ship, a loan of \$30-million worth of farm commodities, and the right to draw a minimum of \$5 million in non-military excess equipment, the arrangement opens the possibility of \$400 million in bank credits through the Export-Import Bank for economic development programs in Portugal. Although a majority of the Senate voted with Republican Senator Clifford Case of New Jersey to block passage of the Azores agreement, the Case Amendment ultimately failed in the House.

Seen in its fullest light, American aid can free funds for the African wars that otherwise might have been spent for overdue development in the metropole. The agreement might prolong the outcome of the wars, but cannot prevent the eventual withdrawal of Portugal from Africa. There exists, of course, the possibility that funds from the new base agreement, if used for modernization, could ease Portugal's tran-

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⁶ For a detailed examination of American-Portuguese relations since the outbreak of the African insurgencies, see John Marcum, "The United States and Portuguese Africa: A Perspective on American Foreign Policy," *Africa Today*, Vol. 18, No. 4 (October, 1971), pp. 23-37.

⁷ The new five-year agreement was made retroactive to January, 1969, when Lisbon requested the opening of negotiations, although serious talks were begun much later.

Thomas H. Henriksen has published half a dozen articles, two of which deal with aspects of Portugal in Africa and African resistance.

"The palmy days of African subservience to France are clearly over and, whatever the outcome of the French election of 1973, it is clear that France's African policy will have to be overhauled. As it stands, Pompidou's grand tours appear to be the last kicks of an old policy, rather than, as he pretended, the first kicks of a new one."

France and Africa

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IT IS WIDELY RECOGNIZED both within Africa and without that the decolonization of France's West African territories has been far from total. While it is plain that the United Kingdom also retains significant post-imperial links with its former possessions, its ties are by contrast not so binding as those of the French. Supporting this contention is the continued presence of about 6,500 French troops in West Africa which can intervene in domestic crises and have done so in the cases of Gabon and Chad. Similarly, although there has been a limited amount of Africanization in trade and industry in French-speaking African states, the post-colonial period has seen massive increases in the French population of major towns like Abidjan and Dakar. France also remains firmly at the helm through the implicit control she can yield by means of her commanding position in the franc zone.

The reasons for this are not hard to discover. The relatively greater independence of the Commonwealth West African territories derives not only from the particular ways in which they gained independence but also from their significantly more powerful economies. Even before independence, African politicians in Ghana and Nigeria had begun to diversify their trading relations among Western and in some cases among Eastern bloc countries, although of course Britain retained a lion's share. With obvious exceptions of relatively recent origin, like the new wealth of the Ivory Coast, the ex-French states operate from weaker economic bases. Even had the wish existed, this inherent weakness inhibited the pursuit of independence from France. The protection of French preference and the real dangers of defying French guidance were potent goads. Guinea, which voted against association with France in the 1958 referendum, found herself bereft of nearly every aspect of vital French assistance and suffered and suffers the dire economic consequences of her intransigence. Some Francophone

states, moreover, are ruled by regimes which also derive significant political strength from French support, which in the case of the military presence is, of course, potentially physical. This is a powerful adjunct to moral and economic support when a government is confronting groups eager for change. There are, thus, a number of significant factors which maintain the ruling elites' faith in this close and (some would say) neocolonial relationship.

This is not to say that the system is without its critics, both African and French. In Africa, both Guinea and Congo (Brazzaville) remain largely beyond the French pale. In 1972, strong symptoms of resentment were also manifested for example in the Mauretanian government's energetic demands for change in the treaties of cooperation she has signed with France. While her arguments, couched as they have been in strong terms of protest against both economic and emotional neocolonialism, stand out, there have been similar if less forceful requests from other states, like Niger and Cameroon.

In France, too, despite France's slightly relaxed grip on her African sphere of influence since the post-1968 dilution of doctrinaire Gaullism there is opposition to different aspects of the relationship from both the right and the left. The recent manifesto of the Mitterand/Marchais Communist-Socialist alliance has declared that the alliance, if elected, would eliminate organizations like the Secretariat for African and Malagasy Affairs, dominated for so long by Jacques Foccart, in many senses the architect of the Gaullist African policy. By contrast, there have been rumblings in the right-wing press expressing strong dissatisfaction with any change in the relationship which would prove to be a burden rather than a benefit to the French taxpayer, already the victim of one of the highest costs of living in the world.

President Georges Pompidou recently stated that

France's policy in Africa was characterized by both change and continuity. It could be argued reasonably that until very recently there had been infinitely more continuity than change. But despite the reaffirmation of Gaullism implicit in the replacement of Premier Jacques Chaban-Delmas by Pierre Messmer—himself incidentally an old “Africa hand”—it seems clear that changes in Paris and directives resulting from these changes are no longer enough to keep together a framework that has not altogether stood the test of time.

It is against this general background that the recent visits of President Pompidou to Africa must be seen. In 1971, the French President traveled to Mauretania, Senegal, Ivory Coast, Cameroon and Gabon. In January, 1972, he visited Niger and Chad, and in November of the same year he went to Upper Volta and Togo. His visit to Dahomey was frustrated by the coup d'état there of October 26, but he has a number of other visits in mind. For example, during the state visit to Paris of the Malian President in April, 1972, Pompidou accepted Moussa Traore's invitation to visit that country. Also on the President's future itinerary are Zaire—francophone but not ex-French—Madagascar, Ethiopia and the French territory of the Afars and Issas. The only relations who appear to be missing on the avuncular grand tour are Guinea, Congo-Brazzaville and the Haiti-like Central African Republic, whose President wept openly at Charles de Gaulle's Colombey graveside.

JOCKEYING FOR POSITION

This exhaustive and exhausting public-relations exercise is certainly prompted by more than a presidential urge to travel. On the one hand, Pompidou has been concerned to pour oil on increasingly troubled waters, and the well-drilled rapture of the welcoming crowds at all his stops has not drowned acrimony in less public rooms. On the other hand, the visits must be construed as a positive attempt by France to retain her initiative in Africa now that British membership in the European Economic Community has been secured; this change in the composition of the EEC brings with it the applications for membership of a number of Commonwealth African states which, if accepted, will considerably weaken French power within the EEC in African affairs. There are deep French misgivings over the jockeying for position that is taking place.

The fears of the French are not ill-founded. It is highly probable that Britain hopes to erode the near monopoly of France in French-speaking Africa. Moreover, some Commonwealth states have apparently seen their new role in part as a role of support for their Francophone neighbors in their attempt to gain more independence—economic and political—from the old colonial metropole. The deepest French fear,

and one that initiated a powerful diplomatic offensive, is a fear that the negotiations leading to the admission of the 19 “associables,” 13 of whom are Commonwealth African states, will lead to an attempt to force a new set of association agreements more favorable to the Africans than those now in force for the 20 states presently associated with the EEC.

French diplomacy is bedeviled in all this not only by the growing restiveness of some of the ex-colonies but also by the fact that the leading voice among the “associables” is that of Nigeria, in many senses the new “giant” of Africa. France hardly won Nigerian friendship by her scarcely concealed support (through some of her African satellites) for the Biafran cause in the recent civil war. Nigeria's position as a potential leader has been reinforced by the niggardly treatment the 20 states presently “associated” have received at the hands of the six member states of the EEC. France will find it difficult to court Nigeria. Hopes are now pinned on a high-level visit to Nigeria scheduled to take place in 1973 by André Bettancourt of the French Foreign Ministry.

Although there are grounds for her fears, France is over-reacting. For example, Nigeria is at present in a strong economic position and is consequently likely to opt for association with the EEC only on the basis of a limited trade agreement without preferences, without common institutions and without aid. But it is doubtful that Nigeria will be able to represent all 13 African “associables,” let alone the 20 associates who, despite their reverses, have recently reaffirmed their commitment to the EEC. Still it is clear that France must do some fairly dramatic fence-repairing if her position in Africa is not to decline seriously.

Pompidou began his November, 1972, African itinerary in the right vein. In Upper Volta, whose minuscule economy is one of Africa's weakest, he promised to give money away. France, he said, would support projects aimed at the stimulation of agriculture, the improvement of water supplies, and education and general economic development. He also promised to act as honest broker with the World Bank and other countries to raise loans to develop the exploitation of Upper Volta's manganese resources. In Togo, he also promised a major increase in French aid.

A DIPLOMATIC PLOY

This was undoubtedly a successful *hors d'oeuvre*; but the main dish, a bombe surprise, was even more exciting. Again speaking in Upper Volta, he announced that France intended to renounce all the debts incurred by the old French colonies of Africa *before independence*. In all, it appears that such states had run up debts approximating \$208 million. Since that time, of course, far heavier indebtedness has been incurred, and there was no suggestion that post-independence debts would be renounced. In his

speech to the Assembly of Upper Volta, Pompidou stressed the fact that his government recognized that the financial position of the developing world had deteriorated because of the world economic situation. He said that in some poor countries new loans merely repaid old debts. Such a situation demanded a new approach and, *avant garde* as ever, France was taking the lead in rethinking her policy of cooperation. He stressed the fact that his government would take measures to improve loans procedure to make it bear less heavily upon the less developed world.

The cancellation of the pre-independence debts is a small concession, although it created a furore in the right-wing press in France. African leaders are not foolish enough to look even a small gift-horse in the mouth. But the concession and the speech served two significant purposes. First, they showed that the French government was sensitive to the demands of the misnamed and misnumbered "group of 77" less developed nations at the UNCTAD meeting at Santiago in 1972. Indeed, in his speech in the Voltaic House of Assembly, Pompidou actually stated that the 77's resolution on special aid at Santiago had been the inspiration of this move.

The promise of more loans and the cancellation of debts are attractive carrots for the flagging faithful, but the second aspect of the concession demands more attention. It is a neat piece of diplomacy that leaves the British Prime Minister, Edward Heath, looking even more parsimonious than before. Britain is faced with a strong and constant demand from a number of Commonwealth African states for the active reconsideration of their debt burdens to the United Kingdom. Prominent among these states is Ghana. In domestic British terms, the widespread unpopularity of the government's decision to admit the Asians thrown out of Uganda and the tense economic situation make the context in which the British government would cancel such debts (in the unlikely situation that the government wanted to do so) fraught with political dangers. Upper Volta is Ghana's northern neighbor and there is no doubt that President Pompidou wished his generosity to be seen beyond the immediate confines of the Francophone world.

Just how successful this gambit will prove to be is hard to estimate. While African heads of state welcome reprieves, as all men do, the relief for each individual state (remembering that the total amount must be divided by a number of territories) is small. Within Francophone Africa, there are other and more pressing worries which agitate leaders. The demonstration effect of the French action outside Francophone Africa is also questionable. French control over ex-dependencies is part of Anglophone African legend. In some senses the legend is truth, but it is often manipulated by politicians to show how much worse things are next door. It is unlikely that Commonwealth

African leaders will interpret Pompidou's move as unambiguously generous. Moreover, it seems hard to conceive of how much more Heath can be discredited in Commonwealth Africa. His political indifference to Black Africa is both well-known and exaggerated in the press of many African states. Far more important than this bit of upstaging is the apparent restoration of good relations between Nigeria and Britain, heralded by the visit to London of the Nigerian foreign minister in late 1972, itself a consequence of the successful visit of Lord Carrington, the British secretary of defense, to Nigeria in August, 1972.

But, as already suggested, President Pompidou's announcement amounted to little more than an ingratiating opening ploy. It did little to restore the firmness of the "special relationship." Far more significant were the French President's various pronouncements on that relationship. As was to be expected, they were shrouded in ambiguity.

In Upper Volta, Pompidou affirmed that African states were independent in a very real sense. They were not only independent, but independence was guaranteed by France's cooperation, a cooperation that was always there should they choose to avail themselves of it. African states, Pompidou said, were free to choose their own courses, but his government had no intention of imposing aid or cooperation where it was not wanted. With the memory of what voting "no" meant for Guinea, the option appeared to be no option at all.

This simple formulation is no real modification of the hard-line Gaullist policy of the 1960's. But its interpretation was made more difficult by later comment on Pompidou's speech by France's secretary for cooperation. His footnote to the President's overall position was that a three-tier system was envisioned. First, those states who wished to remain as they were vis-à-vis France could do so. A second tier would comprise those who had no wish to terminate their relationship with France but wished to modify the terms of the relationship. The final tier, a sort of residual layer, would be made up of those states who wished to break loose altogether. To what extent this banal formulation represented any new drift in French-African relations is hard to conceive. It looked remarkably like a mirror of the situation on the ground. It recognized the groundswell against the status quo, but in careful language it wielded the stick as well as the carrot.

Just as Pompidou and his entourage were defensive about the general trajectory of the "special relation-

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"No East African state . . . has yet had to face the challenge of a constitutional transfer of power to second generation or opposition political leaders," notes this specialist, who evaluates the stability of the nations of the region.

Political Stability in East Africa: An Evaluation

BY JAY E. HAKES

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ALTHOUGH EVENTS in West Africa have often overshadowed those in East Africa, the latter area has commanded an increasing share of attention in recent years. Julius Nyerere, President of Tanzania, has clearly replaced the late Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana as the leading political philosopher of Anglophone Africa. Kenya serves as the headquarters of much of the continent's economic activity. In Uganda, a 1971 coup brought the armed forces to power. And the East African Community (EAC) has been as successful as any other attempt at economic integration in Africa.

The events of the next few years will have a decisive impact on political institutions in East Africa. Military coups d'état have struck about half of the former colonies of West Africa; in East Africa, where independence came several years later, civilian rule has so far survived somewhat more intact. Army mutinies had to be put down in 1964 in Tanzania, Uganda and Kenya, and in 1971 the military seized power in Uganda. Still, Tanzania, Kenya and Zambia have achieved eight to ten years of independent, civilian rule. No East African state, however, has yet had to face the challenge of a constitutional transfer of power to second generation or opposition political leaders—a challenge few states in Africa have met successfully.

UGANDA'S COUP

On January 25, 1971, while Uganda's President A. Milton Obote was attending a Commonwealth conference in Singapore, the Ugandan army, headed by Major General Idi Amin Dada, overthrew what came to be known as the "First Republic." By the end of February, Amin had had all legislative authority vested in himself and had assumed the title of President. Not surprisingly, the coup and its aftereffects caused considerable anxiety among Uganda's neighbors.

In the first place, coups are often contagious. In the West African coups of the 1960's and during the 1964 mutinies in East Africa, military unrest in one state seemed to set off a chain reaction in neighboring countries. At present, events in Uganda have not led to similar action elsewhere.

Secondly, when deposed President Obote returned from Singapore, he was granted asylum by Tanzania's President Julius Nyerere, who refused to recognize the Amin regime. The resulting dispute between Amin and Nyerere brought about a breakdown in the operation of the East African Community, to which Uganda, Tanzania and Kenya belong. At one point, flights by East African Airways between Uganda and Tanzania were suspended. More important, for a time the border between Uganda and Tanzania was closed, and a virtual state of war existed after Ugandan exiles invaded Uganda from Tanzanian territory.

The EAC survived the crisis, as both Uganda and Tanzania eventually proved willing to make the compromise necessary for the maintenance of its day-to-day functioning. Moreover, in October, 1972, negotiations in Mogadishu, Somalia, attended by Tanzania's Foreign Minister John Malecela, Ugandan Foreign Minister Wanume Kibedi, Somali President Mohamid Sayid, and Organization of African Unity Secretary General Nzo Ekganki produced further improvement in relations. A joint communiqué on October 6, 1972, provided for a withdrawal of troops from border areas, inspection by impartial observers, cessation of hostile propaganda, and an agreement "to refrain from harboring or allowing subversive forces to operate from the territory of one State against the other." The concessions contained in the settlement were prompted, in part, by the criticism directed at both sides that their dispute was damaging the cause of African unity.

A third cause of nervousness in East Africa has been the erratic behavior of Amin. Both in domestic and foreign relations, Uganda's policies have undergone sudden and dramatic shifts. As a result, discussions about Amin often focus on whether the former champion boxer should be regarded as a madman or a misunderstood genius.

Immediately after the coup, Amin earned a reputation as a conservative because of his reversal of Obote's economic programs, which had provided for 60 per cent government ownership of 80 large companies operating in Uganda. The new President set a more modest 49 per cent as the appropriate target for government ownership. Nonetheless, in December, 1972, he ordered a complete takeover of a number of foreign firms, particularly those owned by the British, thus reversing his policies within a period of less than two years.

Most severely affected by Amin's actions have been Uganda's Asian residents. On August 9, 1972, Amin set a 90-day limit by which time all Asians without Ugandan citizenship had to leave the country. The intervention of the United Nations and the International Red Cross alleviated some of the suffering caused by the massive relocation of people, but Amin would not relent on his deadline. By November 8, 45,000 Asians had left the country, 27,000 of them with British passports airlifted to the United Kingdom. Asians with Ugandan citizenship were not ordered to leave, but their position in the country remains precarious.

Amin's attacks on Asians were interpreted by some observers as an attempt to divert attention from his domestic political problems. Sporadic outbreaks of fighting in the army have demonstrated that ethnic rivalries there have not been ended, and after an initial honeymoon period Amin's standing with many Ugandan Africans has dropped. In the past year, several of Uganda's most prominent citizens, including her Chief Justice, B. K. M. Kiwanuka, have mysteriously disappeared from public view and are presumed to be dead. The departure of Asian businessmen will open up new opportunities for some of the African elite, who might as a result become less likely to oppose Amin. On the other hand, the Asian exodus will depress the overall economic situation, at least in the short run, and will produce unemployment in some sectors.

Amin's behavior has been as unpredictable in foreign as in domestic affairs. Most notably, formerly cordial relations with Britain and Israel have been sharply reversed. The United Kingdom recognized the Amin regime within two weeks of the coup, be-

coming the first country to do so. The British, however, have resisted pressures from East African members of the Commonwealth to accept Asian residents with British passports. Britain's displeasure with Amin's policies toward Asians and the resulting pressure on Britain to accept the Asians sparked a deterioration in relations. In October, 1972, Amin expelled the British High Commissioner, Richard Slater, from the country, and accused the British of planning to invade Uganda. Subsequently, Britain cancelled a \$24-million loan agreement with Uganda, and Amin announced his nationalization program aimed at British firms.

In 1971, Obote had accused Israel of masterminding Amin's coup against him; but by March, 1972, Amin had denounced the Israelis and closed their embassy. At the same time, Uganda began turning to the Arab states, particularly to Libya, for aid.

After two hectic years in power, Amin seems to be trying to establish himself as a militant nationalist. Because of his inconsistent behavior and the lack of clearly articulated goals, however, he has not yet been embraced by those with strong nationalist credentials in sub-Saharan Africa.

ROOTS OF INSTABILITY

The weaknesses of Ugandan political institutions before the 1971 coup provide a model against which neighboring political systems and their prospects for stability can be assessed.

One problem that Uganda has never been able to overcome is the severe sectionalism that pervades her politics. British colonial rule in Uganda gave favored positions to several of the traditional kingdoms and encouraged strong ethnic identification. Much of post-independence politicking revolved around issues relating to attempts to preserve or diminish the entrenched privileges of certain groups, particularly the Baganda. The conflict reached a dramatic climax in 1966, when Prime Minister Obote had five Cabinet ministers arrested, suspended the constitution, and dismissed Sir Edward Mutesa, the Kabaka of Buganda, as President of Uganda. When the Baganda resisted Obote's new constitution, the central government captured the Kabaka's palace after a brief but bloody battle.

Public appeals to traditional ethnic loyalties became less common after 1966, but the problems of sectionalism, while less apparent, remained. As Nelson Kasfir has said:

The revival of traditional culture [in Uganda] becomes important only so long as it can serve as a weapon to help achieve modern political goals—relatively higher status, more administrative jobs, and more development projects.¹

In the competition between sections for political benefits, Obote was charged by his opponents with favoring

¹ Nelson Kasfir, "Cultural Sub-Nationalism in Uganda," in Victor A. Olorunsola, ed., *The Politics of Cultural Sub-Nationalism in Africa* (Garden City, New York: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1972), p. 97.

his own area in Lango over other areas of the country. This viewpoint, which was widespread, seriously undermined the legitimacy of the Obote government.

A second weakness leading to the overthrow of the First Republic was the ineffectiveness of several national political structures. The ruling party, the Uganda People's Congress, served more as an arena for factional disputes than as a vehicle for generating popular control of and support for the government. The existence of representative institutions such as national assemblies can often enhance the legitimacy of governments, but the Ugandan Parliament failed to operate as a representative institution. At the time of the coup, for instance, more than one-fifth of the seats in Parliament were vacant, because members had been detained by the government or had died, and because no by-elections had been held after 1966.

Furthermore, no general elections were held after independence in October, 1963. In 1970, Obote had announced a new electoral system intended to "foster the unity of the country and enhance the confidence of the people in the Members of the National Assembly as true representatives of the interests of all parts of Uganda and the aspirations of Uganda as a whole."² Since the plan had not been implemented at the time of the coup, however, Obote's mandate from the people was dated at best, and this situation increased his vulnerability to a coup.

Armies, of course, intervene in the political process for their own peculiar reasons, usually related to the protection of their institutional interests. In Uganda, for instance, the coup was triggered by factional competition within the army and by the desire of the military to defend and extend its share of influence and resources. The military is generally reluctant to intervene, however, unless a state of "political decay" exists. As in Uganda, this generally means that legitimating institutions such as elections and Parliaments are inoperative or ineffective, that favoritism of one section of the country over others exists or is at least widely believed to exist, and that the public has become cynical about the governmental process.³

INNOVATION IN TANZANIA

Tanzania offers a sharp contrast to pre-coup conditions in Uganda and, most probably, offers the best prospects for political stability in East Africa. Sectionalism has had a relatively minor impact on Tanzanian politics. None of the tribal-linguistic groups

is very large; hence, none can assume a dominant position. In addition, Swahili, which is more widely used in Tanzania than in other countries, tends to offset problems caused by the multiplicity of tribal languages.

The political reforms that President Nyerere initiated with the Arusha Declaration in 1967 have also made significant contributions to Tanzania's prospects for stability. The army mutiny in 1964 exposed a weakness that Tanzania shared with most new nations, i.e., political power was so concentrated in the capital that a military unit seizing the principal airport, the government's radio station, and the capital city could immobilize the entire government. A major thrust of post-Arusha Tanzania has been decentralization. The policy has several purposes, but one of them is clearly to increase the security of the government against a military takeover.

The key move in decentralizing the country's only party, the Tanganyika African National Union (TANU), has been the attempt to establish party cells for every ten houses. The ten-house cells, which were begun in Dar es Salaam at the end of 1964, are supposed to give the ruling party closer contact with the people throughout the country.

A plan to decentralize the organization of government was announced in January, 1972, and implementation began in July. Expenditures and planning previously done at the national level were to be administered by Tanzania's 18 regions. As a result, changes in spending priorities within regions are now permitted without direct authorization from Dar es Salaam. The new autonomy given to regional and local governments represents an upgrading of positions like that of regional and area commissioner. In addition, to emphasize the new status of regional government, Nyerere established a new post of director of development for each region, and juggled his Cabinet in order to send five ministers into posts as regional commissioners.

In theory, decentralization within the party and the government means that TANU's organization is so entrenched throughout the country that it could withstand a military seizure of Dar es Salaam. Whether or not this is actually the case, remarkable progress in strengthening the organs of the civilian government has occurred since the army mutiny of 1964.

The smooth operation of the electoral process has also contributed to the strength of the TANU government. Since independence, two general elections have been held at regular five-year intervals. In both the 1965 and 1970 contests, opposition parties were not permitted. However, the voters were given a choice between two TANU candidates. They used their options to defeat many incumbent representatives, and both elections produced Parliaments with a

² A. Milton Obote, *Proposals for New Methods of Election of Representatives of the People to Parliament* (Kampala: U.P.C. National Headquarters, 1970), p. 1.

³ For a study of the importance of legitimating institutions for stability in six African states, including those in East Africa, see Jay E. Hakes, "The Weakness of Parliamentary Institutions as a Prelude to Military Coups in Africa: A Study in Regime Instability," a paper presented at the Forty-Third Annual Meeting, Southern Political Science Association, Gatlinburg, Tennessee, November 11-13, 1971.

majority of new members. The effect of this process was, as Goran Hyden and Colin Leys have said, that "the voters in the elections of 1965 and 1970 obtained a new sense of trust, however general and vague, in the government."⁴

The ability of Tanzanian leaders to institute innovative political reforms has not, of course, eliminated all threats to political stability. The periodic use by the government of its powers of detention demonstrates its nervousness about real or imagined threats to its security.

In addition, party and governmental reforms adopted on the mainland, formerly Tanganyika, have not been extended to the island of Zanzibar, which has been part of the United Republic of Tanzania since 1964. Zanzibar has her own political institutions, despite the fact that Zanzibari representatives sit in the Tanzanian National Assembly. On April 7, 1972, Sheik Karume, who was First Vice President of Tanzania, chairman of the Zanzibar Revolutionary Council, and president of the Afro-Shirazi party, was assassinated. President Nyerere quickly appointed Aboud Jumbe, formerly Minister of State in the First Vice President's office, to take over Karume's duties.

Nyerere's philosophy of African socialism has stimulated vigorous social and economic reform in Tanzania. Despite the problems that Tanzania continues to face, these reforms have given her a strong sense of direction. If over a long period of time the country's political institutions can provide a stable setting in which social and economic reform can continue, Tanzania may well become the leading model for African development.

KENYA AND ZAMBIA

Kenya and Zambia are similar in several regards. First, sectionalism in both countries, while less severe than in Uganda, is clearly more of a problem than it is in Tanzania. Second, Kenya with her advanced agriculture and tourist industries and Zambia with her copper mining are richer than Uganda or Tanzania. Third, each has had one relatively open national election since independence. Finally, both have postponed important decisions affecting party politics that will have to be faced in the near future.

Kenya manifests many signs of stability. Her Parliament is the most active in Africa, and the openness of debate there indicates a measure of self-confidence on the part of the government. President Jomo Kenyatta is a strong symbol of unity and commands a capable and powerful bureaucracy. The stability

of Kenya, however, has been threatened on several recent occasions. The Secretary General of the ruling Kenya African National Union (KANU), Tom Mboya, was assassinated in July, 1969, and all opposition members of Parliament were detained in October of that year. In 1971, the government uncovered a plot to overthrow it. The chief of the Defense Staff, Major General J. M. L. Ndolo, was dismissed and the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, Kitili Mwendwa, resigned, after being implicated in the plot. Still, on the surface, Kenya has remained rather calm in recent years. Former Vice President and opposition leader Oginga Odinga has been released from detention and has rejoined KANU, which is now Kenya's only party.⁵

The most serious problems in the Kenyan political system are the intense factionalism involved in the jockeying for position beneath Kenyatta and serious doubts about whether the "rules of the game," particularly those governing KANU, are sufficiently established to withstand the struggle to succeed the aged President. Over the years, politicians like Odinga, Mboya, and current Vice President Daniel arap Moi have established strong positions as potential successors to Kenyatta. However, coalitions have always been formed to block any apparent front-runner. This situation has produced factional disputes within the party at both the national and local levels. Consequently, the party has been plagued by frequent jurisdictional disputes, and the holding of branch elections has often been marred by turmoil and, at times, even violence.

Attempts to hold party elections in 1972 exposed these weaknesses, which have deep roots in the colonial period. Party elections at the district level were scheduled for March, to be followed by a national conference in July. The elections were called to rejuvenate the party's long dormant machinery and to fill top party posts, such as Mboya's old position as Secretary General, which had been occupied only on an interim basis since his death. A national conference had not been held since 1966, so the scheduled contests provided a rare opportunity to alter the balance of power in KANU and in any eventual succession struggle. The competition became so intense, however, that the elections were postponed twice, the second time indefinitely. Robert Matano, the Acting Secretary General of KANU, complained in July that

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⁴ Goran Hyden and Colin Leys, "Elections and Politics in Single-Party Systems: the Case of Kenya and Tanzania," *British Journal of Political Science*, 2 (October, 1972), 413.

⁵ The constitution of Kenya has not been amended to outlaw opposition parties. They must, however, be registered by the government, which in several cases has refused to do so.

"Fighting is dying down in some parts of the Sahel—a physiographic and cultural frontier between Arab and black Africa that runs across the continent from the Atlantic to the Red Sea. But instability is still the prevailing condition in many places."

The Sahel—Africa's "Great Divide"

BY KEITH IRVINE

Author of *Rise of the Colored Races*

TWO GIANT EAST-WEST demarcation lines cross the African continent, stretching all the way from the Atlantic to the Indian Ocean or its tributary seas. The shorter—and more publicized—of the two lines symbolizes the polarization of Africa's black-versus-white racial problems. Situated south of the Equator, it marks the winding frontier between the bloc of black African states to the north, and that bloc of states and territories to the south in which, explicitly or implicitly, white power remains paramount. Yet it is the second and longer demarcation line—the Sahel,¹ marking the boundary between Arab and black Africa—which has greater historic and geographic significance. About 3,000 miles in length, it runs approximately from St. Louis in Senegal to Massawa in Ethiopia, via Timbuktu in Mali and Khartoum in the Sudan—that is to say, in the vicinity of the sixteenth parallel north. Within recent years, the political significance of the line has also increased. Fighting has taken place in Chad, in the Sudan and in the Eritrean region of Ethiopia, as different ways of life have come into conflict, or as local passions have been heated with outside encouragement.

Perhaps one reason why the existence of this politically sensitive zone has not been more widely recognized is because it has hitherto had no generally accepted name, and many of the names which suggest themselves—the sixteenth parallel, the Muslim Line, or the Timbuktu Traverse—are not sufficiently accurate. Even the best descriptive word—the Sahel, an Arabic word meaning "shore," referring to the transitional belt which borders the Sahara, as if the Sahara itself were a "sea"—is not completely accurate, be-

cause the political fracture line sometimes tends to run further south, entering the Sudanic belt, especially as it proceeds eastward.

Although the "Great Divide," which in some ways separates the whole of northern Africa from the rest of the continent, represents no geological frontier, it might nevertheless be compared to a kind of political and cultural "San Andreas fault"²—a fracture zone where, instead of geological plates, two separate ways of life, under the impulsion of deep if sometimes obscure forces, are liable to come sporadically into collision, producing political earthquakes. Yet the demarcation line itself remains essentially static, since the differences that it represents are based for the most part on natural conditions prevailing in each region.

The Sahel is a transitional zone in which the wilderness to the north blends into the acacia-studded grasslands of the Sudanese savanna belt to the south. It is approximately coincident with a line to the north of which the rainfall drops rapidly below an average of ten inches a year and becomes erratic in occurrence. The transitional zone also approximates to the African sector of the great biogeographic frontier which rings the world, separating the plant and animal life of the northern regions (the Holarctic realm) from that of the southern regions (the Paleotropical realm).

It was a percipient nineteenth-century British imperialist, Sir George Goldie, founder of the Royal Niger Company, who—in opposing plans for a Cape to Cairo trade axis—noted that in Africa the natural lines of intercourse between different groups of peoples ran crosswise, east to west, rather than lengthwise.³ "Africa taken crosswise," he said, "is homogeneous, whereas lengthwise it is heterogeneous." Nowhere in Africa, perhaps, is the observation so pertinent as in the vital belt to the south of the Sahara where, roughly between the fifteenth and seventeenth parallels, there is a division between the nomadic pastoral way of life of the desert and the sedentary or semi-sedentary way of life of those to the south, who cultivate the land

¹ i.e., the Sahel zone south of the Sahara. There is also a Sahel zone on the northern "shore" of the Sahara, between the desert and the Maghreb.

² A 700-mile-long fault zone in California, separating the North American plate from the Pacific plate.

³ The trans-Sahara caravan routes, while evidently of historic importance, can hardly be said to be aided by natural conditions.

and raise livestock. The nomadic characteristic of mobility is, indeed, one of the factors that help to make the Sahel so politically and militarily volatile.

Like a tide flowing over the desert from Middle Eastern and North African lands, Islam not only reaches the Sahel "shore," but also spills over into parts of some West African coastal states, like Senegal, Guinea and Nigeria. The Sahel, therefore, is not contiguous to the Muslim Line, which may be taken as the line to the north of which 75 per cent or more of the population is Muslim; the course of this line, indeed, runs generally in the vicinity of latitude 14° north, veering sharply to the south in places to include large enclaves of peoples. Thus, although religion, on a continental scale, differentiates northern Africa from black Africa, in local terms the differentiation is often not of immediate significance, except in the Sudan and the Eritrean region of Ethiopia. In West Africa, in particular, religious differences tend to shade into one another. As far back as the fourteenth century, the great Muslim traveler, Ibn Battutah, visiting West Africa south of the Sahara, commented on the striking contrast between the strictness of Islamic observance in the Maghreb and elsewhere, and the less orthodox atmosphere prevailing in Muslim regions on the banks of the Niger—where, for example, women did not even wear veils.

The political volatility of the Sahel region is partially due to its landlocked situation. The greater part of it is hundreds of miles distant from the sea. From the railhead in the east at Nyare in the Sudan (connecting with Port Sudan on the Red Sea) to the railhead in the west at Bamako, Mali (connecting with Dakar, Senegal), more than 2,000 miles of territory are virtually untouched by modern land communication networks. Indeed, during the latter part of the colonial period, when most of this territory was under French administration, the French saw the Sahel strip, as well as the entire Sahara region to the north, as a zone of strategic vulnerability. In view of the vast distances involved it was impossible to occupy it effectively, or to subject its nomadic populations to strict administrative control. The region was therefore regarded as threatened, in time of war, by possible Soviet or Pan-Islamic penetration,⁴ aiming at the capture of Dakar, itself a potential springboard for South American adventures.⁵

French strategies to counter such a thrust were based first on the ability to deliver reinforcements at the most appropriate points on the West African coast (thanks to Western command of the Atlantic), and second on a flanking counterthrust, launched from

bases in Gabon and the Republic of the Congo (Brazzaville). As the 1960's progressed, however, both the Western powers and the Soviets tended to base their contingency planning in the northern and western African hinterlands on the construction and control of giant airstrips in remote areas, to which—in an emergency—large military or paramilitary units from other continents could be airlifted in a matter of hours.

THE SAHEL AND MIDDLE EAST POWERS

The Sahel also plays a major role in the policies towards Africa formulated both by Israel and by the Arabs states. Seeing herself ringed by hostile Arab countries, Israel has sought to establish friendly relations with the "second ring" of states—those lying south of, or else athwart, the Sahel. This policy has experienced some vicissitudes since it was initiated in the 1950's. Particularly since the Six Day War of 1967, some African countries which had previously regarded Israel as a state which had much in common with the Third World came instead to view her as a nascent colonial power, constituting an actual or potential threat to the territory of some other Third World states. The fact that the alienation of land represents perhaps the deepest of African fears has unquestionably had much to do with weakening the relationship between Israel and some of the African states south of the Sahara. Apart from this, insofar as states which impinge on the Sahel are concerned, Israel has clearly had an interest in encouraging or supporting those Sahelian elements which are not allied with Egypt or Libya. In Ethiopia, therefore, Israel has allied herself with the central government in Addis Ababa against the separatists in Eritrea, whereas in the Sudan, she has favored the southern dissidents at the expense of the central government in Khartoum.

Most Arab states, for their part, have similarly sought to maintain friendly relations with the sub-Saharan African states. The late President Gamal Abdel Nasser of Egypt held that his country's place in the world lay within three spheres—represented by the Arab world, the African continent, and the Islamic world as a whole. (Later, he is said to have leaped across the Sahelian divide by supporting the pan-African policies of the late President Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana, in return for tacit African support of his own pan-Arab policies).

Despite this, however, Israel succeeded in establishing close relations with a number of black African states, for example, the Congo (Kinshasa), now the Republic of Zaire. By the 1970's, however, Israel was also having to reckon with the growing economic influence of Arab states like Libya, which had extended aid to the Sudan, Niger and Uganda, and states on the Arabian peninsula, like Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Abu Dhabi, all of which had extended aid to the

⁴ See *Revue de Défense Nationale*, Paris, October, 1960.

⁵ Possibly this thinking was responsible for French President Charles de Gaulle's action in denying Soviet planes refueling facilities in Dakar during the Cuban missile crisis of 1962.

Sudan. The effects of this increased Arab interest in black Africa may have been reflected in recent resolutions of the Organization of African Unity (OAU), which have been increasingly anti-Israeli in tone.

In examining present conditions in the Sahel, a clear pattern emerges. The western section of the demarcation line between Arab and black Africa is, at the present time, considerably more quiescent than the eastern—in large part, no doubt, because of the relative remoteness of the western sector from the strains and hatreds of the Middle East. Thus, from Senegal to Niger, the situation is relatively stable, whereas from Chad to Somalia, violence is sporadic, if not endemic. The situation may, perhaps, be better appreciated if brief consideration is given to each of the seven territories through which the demarcation line runs.

In Senegal, while the northward extension of irrigated farmland at Richard Toll on the Senegal River led to conflict between farmers and newly displaced herdsmen some years ago, the present situation would appear to be stable. In effect, in Senegal, there is political polarization between urbanized Dakar, where social services are concentrated, and the underprivileged remainder of the country, rather than between nomadic pastoralists and sedentary farmers. In Mali and Niger, too, regional stability has apparently been maintained. Chad, however, which shares a common border with Libya (whose militant revolutionary regime has played a major role in promoting Pan-Arabism), has been the scene of guerrilla warfare for some years. Arab guerrilla bands, operating in northern and central Chad, and directed by the Libyan-based outlawed opposition party, the Chad National Liberation Front (FROLINAT), have fought government forces, representing the black populations of the southern part of the country. For a time, French forces supported the Chad government of President Francois Tombalbaye, but after a time French forces were withdrawn, and a reconciliation between the Chad and Libyan governments took place, with President Hamani Diori of Niger acting as mediator. One of the conditions of the reconciliation was an increase in the representation of northerners in the central government at Fort Lamy. Despite the discontinuance of external support, however, a measure of fighting has continued.

In the Sudan, further east, the situation has been even more grave. From 1955 until 1972, the Arab government in Khartoum was at war with black African secessionists in the country's three southern provinces—Bahr El Ghazal, Upper Nile and Equatoria. In the final stages of the war, in which hundreds of thousands are said to have been killed, the black African southerners, organized in the Anyanya movement, received military assistance from Israel, via Uganda. In 1972, however, the conflict was ended under the

terms of the Addis Ababa agreement. While a considerable proportion of that part of the southern population which had fled into exile has now returned home, a number of difficulties have arisen, including problems concerning urgently needed food shipments. As a result, the agreement has been somewhat precariously maintained.

Still further east, meanwhile, for the past ten years intermittent civil war has been continuing in Eritrea, the northern province of Ethiopia. Eritrea was federated with Ethiopia in 1952, but in 1962 Ethiopia unilaterally ended the federation, according Eritrea provincial status instead of the autonomy it had previously enjoyed. Since then, guerrilla warfare has been waged against the Ethiopian government by the Eritrean Liberation Front (E.L.F.), with the support of some Arab countries, among them Syria, Libya and South Yemen. The E.L.F., however, which has received international publicity as a result of its attempts to hijack Ethiopian Airlines planes, has been subject to internal dissension between its Christian and its Muslim partisans.

CONCLUSION

The Sahel as a whole, therefore, today resembles a crack in Africa's political structure—a crack with a wide fissure at its eastern end, which narrows to a mere threadline as it continues into the western part of the continent. Clearly, the negative influence exerted by the perennial Arab-Israeli crisis in the Middle East has adversely affected developments in the eastern Sahel—to such an extent, indeed, that the Arab-versus-black-African conflict there may now be considered a virtual adjunct of the Middle East crisis itself. As all unsolved political crises constitute actual or potential threats to the economic and social well-being of the world community as a whole, this cannot be considered a healthy development in any respect—either for the Middle East itself, for the African continent, or for the rest of the world.

Apart from this, there remains the possibility that when the strong hand of Emperor Haile Selassie of Ethiopia is eventually removed by time, disturbances may occur in the Horn of Africa which could have serious consequences. Ethiopia is almost ringed by Arab states—including Somalia to the east and south-east—and any grave crisis in this region could send a shock along the fracture zone that might well widen and extend the existing fissure. The troubled course of events in Uganda, meanwhile, which has been closely linked with that state's changing relations first

(Continued on page 133)

Keith Irvine, a specialist on African and other Third World areas, is the author of *Rise of the Colored Races* (New York: W. W. Norton, Inc., 1970).

"The disagreements and contradictions that exist in North African-Near Eastern relations are prodigious. . . . Thus . . . the long-term strategy intended to wring concessions from Israel is logical and coherent. However, its viability will depend ultimately on the willingness and ability of key Arab leaders to subordinate their differences."

The Western Sahara-Suez Triangle

BY WILLIAM H. LEWIS
Specialist on North African Affairs

ON JANUARY 1, 1973, Muammar Qaddafi presented a New Year's address to the Libyan people which provided a melancholy assessment of Arab efforts to deal with the Palestine problem. The speech, likened by some observers to a "State of the Arab World" presentation, observed that past strivings for unity had registered no appreciable progress, that momentum in the direction of an effective war effort against Israel was lacking, and that those elements urging Egyptian "military blows" should curb their impatience. In a singular passage dealing with the question of war or peace, the Libyan leader appeared to align himself with Egyptian President Anwar Sadat:

We in Libya do not want a war that is waged on Arab soil. If there is to be war, then we must transfer it to enemy territory. If this is not realized, then the peace they [the Israelis] advocate is much better than losing battles and clashes on Arab territory.

Under circumstances in which the Arab nations are not able to mount a joint effort and the battle cannot be joined in Israel, Qaddafi noted, each Arab country "would have the right" to settle its problems with Israel on a bilateral basis.

In some Arab circles, President Qaddafi's address was greeted as a dramatic shift in Libyan perspective and policy. According to this school of thought, the move was dictated by a combination of the military realities in the Arab world, the deep disappointment felt by Qaddafi with his efforts to foster Arab cooperation, and his desire further to solidify the foundations for collaboration with Egypt—the political bonds between Libya and Egypt are to be strengthened in a federal relationship later in 1973. For to engage in heated polemic with Sadat over future tactics to be adopted vis-à-vis Israel would most assuredly jeopardize prospects for federation with Cairo and would cast a dark shadow over all hope for Arab unity.

Not only does the aforementioned evaluation lack subtlety, it is flawed by another important defect—an

emphasis on short-term tactical considerations which may be plausible but which ignore the broad design of Libyan strategy. For those who are prone to focus on the drifts and sudden lurches in Arab world politics, long-term strategy would appear to be exceedingly rare. However, it is the view of this observer that far from being eccentric and unstructured, the actions of Colonel Qaddafi are part of a well-conceived and clearly focused national strategy.

The point of departure for the Libyan strategy is recognition of the existing impotence of Arab military power. The divisions among Arab leaders are too profound to produce the type of collaboration needed to insure effective military pressure. Moreover, Egypt's experience in the 1969–1970 war of attrition underscores the risk involved in a face-to-face confrontation with Israel by individual Arab countries. Consequently, the Libyan approach will increasingly emphasize a complex blend of political and economic actions intended to isolate Israel and to undermine her standing in the international community. For the foreseeable future, when military action against Israel is to be initiated, it should be conducted by *fedayeen* (Palestine liberation) organizations, both within Israel and elsewhere.

An appreciation of the broad dimension of this strategy may be derived from Libyan initiatives in the African diplomatic realm. A concerted campaign in Africa has resulted in the closing of four Israeli embassies since April, 1972. Israeli representatives were expelled from Uganda in April, 1972, after Libyan offers of economic assistance to President Idi Amin. The Chad, which has enjoyed close relations with Israel for a number of years, followed a similar course on November 28, 1972, apparently at the urging of the government of Libya. This despite the abrasiveness felt at Fort Lamy by the erstwhile support provided by the Qaddafi regime to dissident and separatist groups based in the north—the Saharan reaches of the Chad. By year's end, Congo-Brazzaville had

opted out of her relationship with Israel; Niger, which has declared her ties "inopportune," precipitated the first such rupture of 1973.

The government of Israel, while condemning Arab efforts to erode Israel's diplomatic connections with African nations, has portrayed these denouements as serious but "not a disaster." Nevertheless, if the resolution of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) passed in June, 1972, is any guide for the future, Israel's remaining presence in sub-Saharan Africa may undergo further tests. The majority of OAU members adopted a strongly pro-Arab stand on the Palestine issue and followed this with substantial support for the Arab position in United Nations debates later in 1972 that virtually censured Israel for her "adamant position" with respect to the retention of occupied Arab territories.

Arab diplomatic successes have been extended to other areas as well. It is evident that a number of West European governments, because of their dependence on Middle East oil and trade interests, have modified their positions to accord substantial weight to Arab attitudes and policies. France, for example, has terminated her military assistance to Israel and now relies heavily on the Arab market, which purchases a broad range of relatively sophisticated weaponry. The degree to which Western interests can be weakened is reflected in action taken by the Qaddafi government in nationalizing British Petroleum operations in November, 1971. The officially announced justification for nationalization was the support rendered Iran by the British government in the midst of the Persian Gulf territorial dispute over several offshore islands. Significantly, in the more than 15 months that have elapsed, no compensation of any kind has been paid for nationalized British Petroleum assets.

POLITICAL FACTORS

The viability of the Libyan strategy is likely to face its most severe test in the Arab political arena. To succeed, some degree of solidarity and mutual support must exist among the bulk of Arab leaders.

Many observers share the view that there is little hope for the type of solidarity needed to sustain a long-range strategy. If anything, the Arab states are too much at odds with themselves to prosecute the battle with Israel. Rival crosscurrents, deep-seated personal animosities, and divergent political outlooks tend to undermine hopes for a unified effort. For example, most North African leaders lend support to *fedayeen* groups, and some even provide material assistance. But Libya's leaders do not share a common perspective with Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia with respect to a stance to be struck on King Hussein's break with the Palestine Liberation Organization in 1970-1971. Some, in the name of Islamic solidarity,

would promote revolutionary forces; others prefer a more aloof position.

Similarly, Arab activists have registered few successes in their attempts to secure a united front on other major issues. Libya and Tunisia do not share the same perspective on Persian Gulf questions; Saudi Arabia and Algeria remain worlds apart in attempting to fashion an agreed approach to the place of traditional dogma and sectarianism in the resolution of the Yemen conflict; each of the North African states appears to be courting competing Palestine liberation groups.

CONFLICT WITH ISRAEL

Despite blatant public disagreements, the struggle against Israel has developed a self-sustaining life and momentum of its own. What does the overall picture show at this stage? (1) While there is no evidence that the various liberation movements are willing to bury their differences and to subordinate individual objectives for political cohesion, occasional setbacks have been overshadowed by a number of dramatic actions intended to keep Israeli teeth on edge.

(2) Israeli retaliatory blows have strengthened Arab enmity and, not infrequently, have provoked international pressure for a peace settlement—with terms that do not support the security interests of Israeli Prime Minister Golda Meir's government. While operating within limits determined by internal weaknesses, the Arabs nevertheless are able to dictate the scope and pace of each stroke and counterstroke. Their actions have ranged from terror attacks at Munich (to the acute discomfiture of the West German government) and on El Al aircraft, to *fedayeen* raids within Israel proper and in occupied territory.

(3) This broad field of action can be matched by Israel, but only at considerable cost to her status within the international community.

(4) The relative advantages and costs to both parties appear to balance out over the short-term. The question of staying power over a lengthy period—in terms of elan, internal confidence, diplomatic isolation and assurance of ultimate "victory"—does not lend itself to an unqualified response in favor of either antagonist. However, through the various devices and opportunities available to Arab activists, existing Israeli superiority in the conventional military field can be partially offset.

A major intangible over the long-term continues to be the political durability of the various Arab political systems. Clearly, the strength of purpose of activist groups could be severely tested should existing systems decline or be overwhelmed by internal pressures and problems. The efforts of Moroccan military officers to topple King Hassan on August 16, 1972—the second such attempt in little more than one year—attest to the intangibles that could upset prevailing power

arrangements. Similarly, the strains that confront Tunisia's ruling Destourian-Socialist party in the post-Bourguiba period could dictate the weight of the political balance in North Africa. The termination of Alawite rule through a coup, together with a struggle for power in Tunisia, could bring to an end the relative stability of an important region in the Arab world.

The pace and direction of change in North Africa, thus, could bear heavily on the resolution of the Palestine issue. With the advantages of proximity to West Europe, economic growth potential, resources to be made available to the activists and influence in African councils, the area from Tangier and Nouakchott in the west to Suez in the east forms a vital political, economic and strategic triangle for much of the Arab world.

THE QUALITY OF LEADERSHIP

Conventional wisdom holds that we live in an age of nation-building, one in which a billion or more people of the so-called less developed world are striving with varying degrees of success to fashion modern, viable communities. As Lucien Pye has pointed out, "This is also a time of faith in the miraculous powers of politics." Involved is the definition of new goals, the emergence of new leaders and organizations, and the discovery of lasting values that will place effective limits on competitive politics. In the end, hopefully, common interests and shared values will insure the integrity of evolving political systems.

During the past quarter of a century, North Africa has emerged from the colonial shadows to follow a course intended to shore up the foundations of each nation. The process has been spasmodic in most instances, with each state claiming its own share of traumatic experiences. Throughout, however, the area has benefitted from a post-independence generation of leaders who have exhibited exceptional political skills. These have included Morocco's King Sidi Mohammed Ben Youssef; Algeria's Houari Boumedienne; Tunisia's redoubtable Habib Bourguiba; and Libya's King Idris.

RULERS EVALUATED

These leaders differ widely in temperament: Boumedienne remains an ascetic, whose values are basically puritanical; Bourguiba, a lawyer by training, is mercurial, articulate, insightful; King Mohammed V and Idris I, by comparison, were contemplative, retiring, but forceful when necessary. However, they shared a common perspective on the basic political imperatives of their nation. All have been authoritarian in approach, given the need to forge a unified country; they relied on personal loyalty to tie together seemingly incompatible groups within traditional and modern sectors of their nations. They focused power rather than diffused it: all avoided the type of demo-

gic political sloganeering that, in our age, serves to mask internal tensions rather than ease them; each in his own way provided the time needed to ease the often painful transition from imperial domination to full national sovereignty.

On the other hand, only President Bourguiba has implanted institutions that could help to insure the stable passage of power to succeeding generations of political leaders. The monarchies in Morocco and Libya have depended heavily on personal alliance systems—with tribal power brokers, royalist intellectuals and middle class entrepreneurial groups. Under such systems, logical contenders for power are often stymied, frustrations tend to mount and, as a result of a sense of impotence, recourse to violence appears inevitable.

The deposition of King Idris in September, 1969, by the Libyan armed forces and attempts to follow a similar course in Morocco, both in July, 1971, and in August, 1972, testify to the seeming inevitability of violence that hallmarks closed political systems. In the case of Morocco's King Hassan, who ascended the throne in 1961 following the untimely death of his revered father (Mohammed V), royal prestige has been diminished over a decade by excesses that have weakened fidelity to the throne. These have included: (1) the termination of parliamentary life and the assumption of full powers by King Hassan in June, 1965; (2) the institution of pervasive harassing techniques against opposition political parties, student organizations and labor unions; and (3) the inability to turn the Moroccan economy around and to initiate the measures needed to cope with the dual problems of unemployment and inflation.

Despite these shortcomings, the monarchy provides the principal cement for political life in contemporary Morocco. Hassan is still able to bridge the gulf between rural-traditional and urban-modern communities, to provide a sense of direction to competing political parties and other factions.

THE REVOLUTIONARY STATES

The Boumedienne regime celebrated the tenth anniversary of Algerian independence on July 5, 1972, with considerable fanfare. The regime had cause for pride.

After the desolation of more than seven years of struggle against French rule, the challenge of reconstruction confronted a deeply divided nationalist leadership. Internecine fights within the National Liberation Front (FLN) brought Algeria to the brink of civil war during the summer-fall of 1962.

Ahmed Ben Bella finally emerged as the man of the hour. Imprisoned by the French from 1955 until 1962, Ben Bella was an enigmatic figure whose credentials were ambiguous at best. Substituting an atmosphere of passion for one of reason, Ben Bella rapidly

moved to validate his revolutionary credentials. Visits to Cuba and the Soviet Union, attacks on United States policy, support for sub-Saharan liberation movements, all were used by the Ben Bellists to establish the legitimacy of their claims to preeminence. What materialized, however, was a hothouse variety of sloganeering, ritualization and political pretention. Ben Bella never came to grips with the painful issues of nation-building. He did not tame the dissident elements in the Kabylie region; nor did he work meaningfully to develop a coherent national party or military establishment.

Fortunately for Algeria, Houari Boumedienne, then Defense Minister in the Ben Bellist regime, detected the inanities of the President and determined to bring the circus to an end. On June 19, 1965, he toppled the regime, and assumed personal responsibility for the management of Algerian affairs. In the seven intervening years, Boumedienne has played a superlative role in bringing a measure of order to Algerian affairs.

- In a time of dogmatic cynicism, the regime has provided proof of the value of pragmatism.
- The government has provided a breathing spell, a time of much needed peace and stability.
- While dedicated to the principles of socialism, ideology has been subordinated to the needs of effective government management and domestic economic growth.
- Differences among competing regions and factions have been quashed and a sense of purpose increasingly implanted.
- Institution-building has grown apace with self-confidence and a national sense of purpose.
- The management of government affairs has been turned over to increasingly well-qualified technocrats, and ideological differences have been subordinated in the process.
- Economic growth has become self-sustaining and prospects for the future are now promising (if not euphoric).

LEADERSHIP IN LIBYA

By comparison, the revolutionary leadership in Libya is still going through a time of testing. Unlike the Boumedienne regime, Libya's leaders are still concerned primarily with Arab issues—Palestine, Arab unity and the "battle of destiny." These issues are not used as a distraction for the Libyan population at large, however. The ruling Revolutionary Command Council, rather, believes that they serve to awaken a spirit of "Libyanism" by engendering pride in Arab culture and tradition.

The RCC also has moved with vigor to eliminate the Western military pressure in Libya. Since the 1969 coup, United States and British military installations have been closed, and erstwhile Libyan dependence on United States-British arms supplies has been offset by mounting dependence on France, the Soviet Union and Egypt.

Within the economic sector, Libyan growth has accelerated beyond the pace of the 1960's. The country's estimated per capita gross national product of \$1,800 places Libya among the more affluent nations outside Europe, North America and Japan. However, the country remains deficient in a number of key areas—most particularly, in trained technicians and other important human resource categories, in agricultural production and in industrial diversification. It also lacks a broadly based economic infrastructure.

Moreover, the RCC has lost some of the cohesiveness that assured it political power in 1969. A serious internal crisis apparently seized the RCC in mid-1972, reportedly the result of personality problems and the distribution of power. The crisis was resolved on July 16 with the appointment of Major Abd al-Salam Jalud as Prime Minister and the retention of Colonel Muammar Qaddafi as Chairman of the 12-member RCC. However, more than three years after the RCC assumed power, there are few indications that the bulk of Libyans remain more than apathetic in the face of the RCC effort to foster a new dynamism in Libyan society.

THE OUTLOOK

Any overall assessment of future trends in North Africa must take account of the diverse forces operating in the area. The stability provided in Algeria by the Boumedienne regime may not be emulated in neighboring Morocco, where two recent coup attempts almost toppled King Hassan. The outlook for Tunisia is clouded by questions over the post-Bourguiba succession. For his part, President Qaddafi is anxious to move Libya toward greater unity with Egypt. However, all attempts at political federation in the Arab world have so far failed.

The disagreements and contradictions that exist in North African-Near Eastern relations are prodigious. Libya remains hostile to the Moroccan, Jordanian and Saudi Arabian monarchies; Tunisia remains troubled by Libyan activism and Libya's plans for union with Egypt; Egyptian leadership in the post-Nasser period appears on the wane.

Thus, we end as we began. The long-term strategy intended to wring concessions from Israel is logical and coherent. However, its viability will depend ultimately on the willingness and ability of key Arab leaders to subordinate their differences.

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BOOK REVIEWS

ON AFRICA

SOUTHERN AFRICA IN PERSPECTIVE: ESSAYS IN REGIONAL POLITICS. EDITED BY CHRISTIAN POTHOLM AND RICHARD DALE. (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1972. 418 pages, suggested bibliography and index, \$12.95.)

The editors of this comprehensive volume have successfully depicted "the diversity of convictions and outlooks on Southern Africa." Twenty-three original essays provide a balanced view of the nine countries in the Southern African subsystem. The authors represent a diversity of outlook, and the information contained in the essays is of recent date.

The historical influences molding present trends in the area are faithfully traced. In an unusual conclusion, Christian Potholm utilizes the preceding essays "to extrapolate a set of possible scenarios relevant for the last three decades of the twentieth century." It is particularly interesting to note Potholm's appraisal of the probable future stability of the Portuguese African territories. The chapter notes and the suggested reading list add greatly to the value of the book.

O.E.S.

AFRICA: HISTORY OF A CONTINENT. By BASIL DAVIDSON. (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1972. 320 pages, color photographs, and index, \$12.95.)

Basil Davidson has produced a number of valuable and extremely interesting books on African subjects in recent years. The ambitious latest work is an interesting story of the African continent, its countries and its peoples. The full-color illustrations add much to the interest and the value of the book for the reader.

O.E.S.

THE LIVING ART OF NIGERIA. By WILLIAM FOGG AND MICHAEL FOREMAN. (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1972. 160 pages, color illustrations, and index, \$12.95.)

This handsomely illustrated small volume captures the life of the Nigerian people as exemplified by their crafts and art. In many ways, it is the most interesting of the three Macmillan books on Africa reviewed here, for it shows the way a people live as no written description is able to do. The text complements the illustrations and the result is a vivid picture of a primitive culture.

O.E.S.

BLACK AFRICA: A COMPARATIVE HANDBOOK. By DONALD G. MORRISON, ROBERT S.

MITCHELL, JOHN N. PADEN AND HUGH M. STEVENSON. (New York: The Free Press, 1972. 483 pages, \$29.95.)

The authors bring together comparable data on 32 independent black African nations. The first part of this detailed study presents 172 tables of comparative profiles, from ecology to urban profiles. The second section gives detailed country-by-country analyses. This section also has excellent maps of the 32 countries. The text explains the methods used to locate and collect information, the basis for selection, and the method of analysis used in making up the tables. This book is of particular value to the student of comparative politics.

O.E.S.

FRANCE AND BRITAIN IN AFRICA. EDITED BY PROSSER GIFFORD AND WILLIAM ROGER LOUIS. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1972. 989 pages, bibliography and index, \$30.00.)

According to Harry Rudin, "the partitioning of Africa by the major European powers and the history of the European empires created on that continent are the history of less than a century. . . . This brief history can be looked upon as a mere episode in the history of Africa as well as of Europe; its importance, on the other hand, for both areas remains a large one. . . ." Britain and France sought to establish colonies in the last part of the nineteenth century at a time when colonialism was beginning to be outmoded as governmental policy in both countries. Consequently, private interests explored, administered and exploited the African colonies. The editors have drawn on papers presented at a Concilium on International Studies, held at Yale University in 1968. The authors drew on archival materials from Europe and Africa for their assessments of British and French aims and African reactions. The bibliography is a valuable addition to the study of comparative colonial history.

O.E.S.

THE HISTORY OF WEST AFRICA, VOLUME I. EDITED BY J. F. ADE AJAYI AND MICHAEL CROWDER. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1972. 568 pages and index, \$20.00.)

The editors of this detailed study provide a lucid synthesis of West African history. The reader will be particularly interested in the early history of West Africa and its peoples and the manner in which the countries of West Africa have evolved. Twenty-seven excellent maps and charts aid greatly in the understanding of the text.

O.E.S.

CONGO. BY RICHARD WEST. (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc., 1972. 304 pages, bibliography, notes and index, \$7.95.)

Richard West writes of the remote area that was formerly French Equatorial Africa. Many of the most interesting European explorers and traders visited and lived in the area, and Albert Schweitzer founded his hospital there. Excellent photographs enhance the work; one could wish for more of them.

O.E.S.

GUIDE TO RESEARCH AND REFERENCE WORKS ON SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA. EDITED BY PETER DUIGNAN AND COMPILED BY HELEN F. CONOVER AND PETER DUIGNAN. (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1972. 1,102 pages and index, \$8.95.)

This is a massive and exhaustive aid for librarian and student in the field of African studies. The area covered is Africa south of the Sahara. The book lists reference centers, libraries, archives, publishers and booksellers in its first section. The second part covers various forms of bibliographies. Part three provides a subject guide to the literature of geography, history, politics, anthropology, through almost all categories to science and health. This is no book for the casual reader, but should be invaluable to the serious scholar.

O.E.S.

UGANDA: A CASE STUDY IN AFRICAN POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT. BY PETER M. GUKIINA. (Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 1972. 190 pages, notes and bibliography, \$7.95.)

Peter Gukiina has written a historical and analytical examination of Uganda's development as a nation up to the period which ended with Milton Obote's downfall. The author believes that Uganda's major problem is the diversity of ethnic groups in the country, and he examines Uganda today with that idea as a major focus. It is unfortunate that the book was written before the advent of President Idi Amin. A chapter on very recent Ugandan history would add greatly to the value of the work.

O.E.S.

FROM VILLAGE TO STATE IN TANZANIA. BY CLYDE R. INGLE. (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1972. 279 pages, bibliography and index, \$12.50.)

In this study based on field research in 1967-1968, Professor Ingle shows how the national political system of Tanzanian President Julius Nyerere promotes "modernization in the rural areas" of Tanzania. The author dates the success of this program from the Arusha Declaration, proclaimed by Nyerere in February, 1967, which emphasized

self-reliant development. "Independence cannot be real if a nation depends upon gifts and loans from another for its development," declared Nyerere. The qualified success of the programs started as a result of this national policy is also analyzed in detail by the author.

O.E.S.

AFRICAN LIBERATION MOVEMENTS: CONTEMPORARY STRUGGLES AGAINST WHITE MINORITY RULE. BY RICHARD GIBSON. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1972. 350 pages, bibliography and index, \$8.50.)

The author gives us a comprehensive survey of the continuing struggle to free the African continent from colonialism and white minority rule. Richard Gibson offers a political history of the development of liberation movements throughout Africa, relating each movement to the factors which had the most effect upon it. His rather gloomy conclusion is that "this survey of African liberation movements leads only back to the beginning of what promises to be a bitter, protracted struggle for national independence and liberty."

O.E.S.

LUMUMBA SPEAKS: THE SPEECHES AND WRITINGS OF PATRICE LUMUMBA 1958-1961. EDITED BY JEAN VAN LIERDE. Translated from the French by HELEN R. LANE. (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1972. 433 pages, \$12.50.)

The editor has chosen to show the rapid political evolution of the former Belgium Congo during the three years preceding the assassination of Patrice Lumumba, the first Prime Minister of the independent Congo. Lumumba's life story is not told; only his spoken words and a few pertinent documents are used to show his place in the rapid unfolding of events around him. An index would have been a valuable addition to this volume.

O.E.S.

KWAME NKRUMAH: THE ANATOMY OF AN AFRICAN DICTATORSHIP. BY T. PETER OMARI. (New York: The Africana Publishing Corporation, 1972. 229 pages, appendix, selected bibliography and index, \$8.50.)

Ghana was one of the first colonies in Africa to win independence. She produced one of the first popular heroes of African independence, Kwame Nkrumah, who seized absolute power and established an autocratic government. Omari traces the life of Nkrumah and sets him in the context of the political events of his time. He analyzes the reasons for Nkrumah's downfall in February, 1966, and for the resulting civilian government of Kofi Busia.

O.E.S.

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CURRENT DOCUMENTS

The Agreement for a Cease-Fire in Vietnam

On January 27, 1973, an agreement to end the fighting in Vietnam plus four protocols of detail were signed in Paris. There were two versions of the agreement. One, which did not mention the Provisional Revolutionary Government (Vietcong) in the body of the agreement, was signed by the United States, the Republic of Vietnam (South), the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (North) and the Provisional Revolutionary Government (Vietcong). The other, which mentioned the Provisional Revolutionary Government in its preamble but was otherwise identical, was signed only by the United States and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (North). The texts of the four-party and the two-party agreements follow:

The parties participating in the Paris conference on Vietnam,

With a view to ending the war and restoring peace in Vietnam on the basis of respect for the Vietnamese people's fundamental national rights and the South Vietnamese people's right to self-determination, and to contributing to the consolidation of peace in Asia and the world,

Have agreed on the following provisions and undertake to respect and to implement them:

Chapter I

The Vietnamese People's Fundamental National Rights

ARTICLE 1

The United States and all other countries respect the independence, sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity of Vietnam as recognized by the 1954 Geneva Agreements on Vietnam.

Chapter II

Cessation of Hostilities, Withdrawal of Troops

ARTICLE 2

A cease-fire shall be observed throughout South Vietnam as of 2400 hours G.M.T., on Jan. 27, 1973.

At the same hour, the United States will stop all its military activities against the territory of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam by ground, air and naval forces, wherever they may be based, and end the mining of the territorial waters, ports, harbors and waterways of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. The United States will remove, permanently deactivate or destroy all the mines in the territorial waters, ports, harbors and waterways of North Vietnam as soon as this agreement goes into effect.

The complete cessation of hostilities mentioned in this article shall be durable and without limit of time.

ARTICLE 3

The parties undertake to maintain the cease-fire and to insure a lasting and stable peace.

As soon as the cease-fire goes into effect:

(a) The United States forces and those of the other foreign countries allied with the United States and the Republic of Vietnam shall remain in place pending the im-

plementation of the plan of troop withdrawal. The Four-Party Joint Military Commission described in Article 16 shall determine the modalities.

(b) The armed forces of the two South Vietnamese parties shall remain in place. The Two-Party Joint Military Commission described in Article 17 shall determine the areas controlled by each party and the modalities of stationing.

(c) The regular forces of all services and arms and the irregular forces of the parties in South Vietnam shall stop all offensive activities against each other and shall strictly abide by the following stipulations:

All acts of force on the ground, in the air and on the sea shall be prohibited.

All hostile acts, terrorism and reprisals by both sides will be banned.

ARTICLE 4

The United States will not continue its military involvement or intervene in the internal affairs of South Vietnam.

ARTICLE 5

Within 60 days of the signing of this agreement, there will be a total withdrawal from South Vietnam of troops, military personnel, including technical military personnel and military personnel associated with the pacification program, armaments, munitions and war material of the United States and those of the other foreign countries mentioned in Article 3 (a). Advisers from the above-mentioned countries to all para-military organizations and the police force will also be withdrawn within the same period of time.

ARTICLE 6

The dismantlement of all military bases in South Vietnam of the United States and of the other foreign countries mentioned in Article 3 (a) shall be completed within 60 days of the signing of this agreement.

ARTICLE 7

From the enforcement of the cease-fire to the formation of the government provided for in Articles 9 (b) and 14 of this Agreement, the two South Vietnamese parties shall not accept the introduction of troops, military advisers and military personnel, including technical military personnel, armaments, munitions and war material into South Vietnam.

The two South Vietnamese parties shall be permitted to make periodic replacement of armaments, munitions and

war material which have been destroyed, damaged, worn out or used up after the cease-fire, on the basis of piece-for-piece, of the same characteristics and properties, under the supervision of the Joint Military Commission of Control and Supervision.

Chapter III

The Return of Captured Military Personnel and Foreign Civilians, and Captured and Detained Vietnamese Civilian Personnel

ARTICLE 8

(a) The return of captured military personnel and foreign civilians of the parties shall be carried out simultaneously with and completed not later than the same day as the troop withdrawal mentioned in Article 5. The parties shall exchange complete lists of the above-mentioned captured military personnel and foreign civilians on the day of the signing of this agreement.

(b) The parties shall help each other to get information about those military personnel and foreign civilians of the parties missing in action, to determine the location and take care of the graves of the dead so as to facilitate the exhumation and repatriation of the remains, and to take any such other measures that may be required to get information about those still considered missing in action.

(c) The question of the return of Vietnamese civilian personnel captured and detained in South Vietnam will be resolved by the two South Vietnamese parties on the basis of the principles of Article 21 (b) of the Agreement on the Cessation of Hostilities in Vietnam of July 20, 1954. The two South Vietnamese parties will do so in a spirit of national reconciliation and concord, with a view to ending hatred and enmity, in order to ease suffering and to reunite families. The two South Vietnamese parties will do their utmost to resolve this question within 90 days after the cease-fire comes into effect.

Chapter IV

The Exercise of the South Vietnamese People's Right to Self-Determination

ARTICLE 9

The Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam undertake to respect the following principles for the exercise of the South Vietnamese people's right to self-determination:

(a) The South Vietnamese people's right to self-determination is sacred, inalienable and shall be respected by all countries.

(b) The South Vietnamese people shall decide themselves the political future of South Vietnam through genuinely free and democratic general elections under international supervision.

(c) Foreign countries shall not impose any political tendency or personality on the South Vietnamese people.

ARTICLE 10

The two South Vietnamese parties undertake to respect the cease-fire and maintain peace in South Vietnam, settle all matters of contention through negotiations and avoid all armed conflict.

ARTICLE 11

Immediately after the cease-fire, the two South Vietnamese parties will:

¶Achieve national reconciliation and concord, end hatred and enmity, prohibit all acts of reprisal and discrimination

against individuals or organizations that have collaborated with one side or the other.

¶Insure the democratic liberties of the people: personal freedom, freedom of speech, freedom of the press, freedom of meeting, freedom of organization, freedom of political activities, freedom of belief, freedom of movement, freedom of residence, freedom of work, right to property ownership and right to free enterprise.

ARTICLE 12

(a) Immediately after the cease-fire, the two South Vietnamese parties shall hold consultations in a spirit of national reconciliation and concord, mutual respect and mutual non-elimination to set up a National Council of National Reconciliation and Concord of three equal segments. The council shall operate on the principle of unanimity. After the National Council of National Reconciliation and Concord has assumed its functions, the two South Vietnamese parties will consult about the formation of councils at lower levels. The two South Vietnamese parties shall sign an agreement on the internal matters of South Vietnam as soon as possible and do their utmost to accomplish this within 90 days after the cease-fire comes into effect, in keeping with the South Vietnamese people's aspirations for peace, independence and democracy.

(b) The National Council of National Reconciliation and Concord shall have the task of promoting the two South Vietnamese parties' implementation of this agreement, achievement of national reconciliation and concord and insurance of democratic liberties. The National Council of National Reconciliation and Concord will organize the free and democratic general elections provided for in Article 9 (b) and decide the procedures and modalities of these general elections. The institutions for which the general elections are to be held will be agreed upon through consultations between the two South Vietnamese parties. The National Council of National Reconciliation and Concord will also decide the procedures and modalities of such local elections as the two South Vietnamese parties agree upon.

ARTICLE 13

The question of Vietnamese armed forces in South Vietnam shall be settled by the two South Vietnamese parties in a spirit of national reconciliation and concord, equality and mutual respect, without interference, in accordance with the postwar situation. Among the questions to be discussed by the two South Vietnamese parties are steps to reduce their military effectives and to demobilize the troops being reduced. The two South Vietnamese parties will accomplish this as soon as possible.

ARTICLE 14

South Vietnam will pursue a foreign policy of peace and independence. It will be prepared to establish relations with all countries irrespective of their political and social systems on the basis of mutual respect for independence and sovereignty and accept economic and technical aid from any country with no political conditions attached. The acceptance of military aid by South Vietnam in the future shall come under the authority of the government set up after the general elections in South Vietnam provided for in Article 9 (b).

Chapter V

The Reunification of Vietnam and the Relationship Between North and South Vietnam

ARTICLE 15

The reunification of Vietnam shall be carried out step by

step through peaceful means on the basis of discussions and agreements between North and South Vietnam, without coercion or annexation by either party, and without foreign interference. The time for reunification will be agreed upon by North and South Vietnam.

Pending reunification:

(a) The military demarcation line between the two zones at the 17th Parallel is only provisional and not a political or territorial boundary, as provided for in paragraph 6 of the Final Declaration of the 1954 Geneva Conference.

(b) North and South Vietnam shall respect the demilitarized zone on either side of the provisional military demarcation line.

(c) North and South Vietnam shall promptly start negotiations with a view to re-establishing normal relations in various fields. Among the questions to be negotiated are the modalities of civilian movement across the provisional military demarcation line.

(d) North and South Vietnam shall not join any military alliance or military bloc and shall not allow foreign powers to maintain military bases, troops, military advisers and military personnel on their respective territories, as stipulated in the 1954 Geneva Agreements on Vietnam.

Chapter VI

The Joint Military Commissions The International Commission of Control and Supervision The International Conference

ARTICLE 16

(a) The parties participating in the Paris conference on Vietnam shall immediately designate representatives to form a Four-Party Joint Military Commission with the task of insuring joint action by the parties in implementing the following provisions of this agreement:

¶The first paragraph of Article 2, regarding the enforcement of the cease-fire throughout South Vietnam.

¶Article 3 (a), regarding the cease-fire by U.S. forces and those of the other foreign countries referred to in that article.

¶Article 3 (c), regarding the cease-fire between all parties in South Vietnam.

¶Article 5, regarding the withdrawal from South Vietnam of U.S. troops and those of the other foreign countries mentioned in Article 3 (a).

¶Article 6, regarding the dismantlement of military bases in South Vietnam of the United States and those of the other foreign countries mentioned in Article 3 (a).

¶Article 8 (a), regarding the return of captured military personnel and foreign civilians of the parties.

¶Article 8 (b), regarding the mutual assistance of the parties in getting information about those military personnel and foreign civilians of the parties missing in action.

(b) The Four-Party Joint Military Commission shall operate in accordance with the principle of consultations and unanimity. Disagreements shall be referred to the International Commission of Control and Supervision.

(c) The Four-Party Military Commission shall begin operating immediately after the signing of this agreement and end its activities in 60 days, after the completion of the withdrawal of U.S. troops and those of the other foreign countries mentioned in Article 3 (a) and the completion of the return of captured military personnel and foreign civilians of the parties.

(d) The four parties shall agree immediately on the organization, the working procedure, means of activity and expenditures of the Four-Party Joint Military Commission.

ARTICLE 17

(a) The two South Vietnamese parties shall immediately designate representatives to form a Two-Party Joint Military Commission with the task of insuring joint action by the two South Vietnamese parties in implementing the following provisions of this agreement:

¶The first paragraph of Article 2, regarding the enforcement of the cease-fire throughout South Vietnam, when the Four-Party Joint Military Commission has ended its activities.

¶Article 3 (b), regarding the cease-fire between the two South Vietnamese parties.

¶3(c), regarding the cease-fire between all parties in South Vietnam, when the Four-Party Joint Military Commission has ended its activities.

¶Article 7, regarding the prohibition of the introduction of troops into South Vietnam and all other provisions of this article.

¶Article 8 (c), regarding the question of the return of Vietnamese civilian personnel captured and detained in South Vietnam;

¶Article 13, regarding the reduction of the military effectives of the two South Vietnamese parties and the demobilization of the troops being reduced.

(b) Disagreements shall be referred to the International Commission of Control and Supervision.

(c) After the signing of this agreement, the Two-Party Joint Military Commission shall agree immediately on the measures and organization aimed at enforcing the cease-fire and preserving peace in South Vietnam.

ARTICLE 18

(a) After the signing of this Agreement, an International Commission of Control and Supervision shall be established immediately.

(b) Until the international conference provided for in Article 19 makes definitive arrangements, the International Commission of Control and Supervision will report to the four parties on matters concerning the control and supervision of the implementation of the following provisions of this agreement:

¶The first paragraph of Article 2, regarding the enforcement of the cease-fire throughout South Vietnam.

¶Article 3 (a), regarding the cease-fire by U.S. forces and those of the other foreign countries referred to in that article.

¶Article 3 (c), regarding the cease-fire between all the parties in South Vietnam.

¶Article 5, regarding the withdrawal from South Vietnam of U.S. troops and those of the other foreign countries mentioned in Article 3 (a).

¶Article 6, regarding the dismantlement of military bases in South Vietnam of the United States and those of the other foreign countries mentioned in article 3 (a).

¶Article 8 (a), regarding the return of captured military personnel and foreign civilians of the parties.

The International Commission of Control and Supervision shall form control teams for carrying out its tasks. The four parties shall agree immediately on the location and operation of these teams. The parties will facilitate their operation.

(c) Until the international conference makes definitive arrangements, the International Commission of Control and Supervision will report to the two South Vietnamese parties on matters concerning the control and supervision of the implementation of the following provisions of this agreement:

¶The first paragraph of Article 2, regarding the enforce-

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South Africa were going "from bad to worse" because of South African economic pressure which apparently prevented several Japanese firms from locating in Lesotho.

For its part, the huge, France-sized state of Botswana continued its policy of live and let live with the republic. Sir Seretse Khama and his ruling Botswana Democratic party remained in firm control of the government and continued to pursue their policy of opposing apartheid but cooperating economically with South Africa. Despite her newly discovered mineral wealth, Botswana remains highly dependent upon South Africa for both her exports and her imports. Moreover, as the Minister of Finance and Development Planning, Quett K. J. Masire, has indicated, inflation or deflation in South Africa has an intensified impact on the economy of his country. South Africa thus has considerable economic leverage over her neighbors and will not hesitate to use that leverage in order to insure docility.

Swaziland, whose economy has generally been richer and better balanced than either Botswana or Lesotho, is vulnerable as well. The year 1972 saw the first general elections since independence. The ruling Imbokodvo National Movement, which is led by Prince Makhosini Dlamini and supported by the Ngwenyama, Sobhuza II, won 21 of the 24 seats at stake in the National Assembly, but the opposition party of

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PORTUGAL'S CHANGING FORTUNES

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sition from an African-oriented economy to European economic integration. But without meaningful African participation in the political, economic and educational life of the territories, a precipitous pull-out would result in the solidification of European settler rule and the firm integration of Angola and Mozambique into white southern Africa.

Seemingly, Pretoria also shores up Lisbon's rule in Angola and particularly in Mozambique, which shares a border with South Africa. The giant Anglo-American Corporation of South Africa heads the international consortium, ZAMCO, which finances the construction of the Cahora Bassa dam. Again, there is a preponderance of South African capital in the Cunene River project. To protect its investments and the Angolan and Mozambican buffer states, Pretoria has reportedly sent clandestine police and military units to help Portugal fight the guerrilla forces.

Both the Azores agreement and South African aid

warrant further analysis, for paradoxically they foreshadow a diminution of Lisbon's authority rather than its indefinite underpinning. South African involvement in Angola and Mozambique will weaken Lisbon's authority. There exists the remote possibility that white home-rule groups could seek accommodation with reasonably "moderate" nationalist movements like the GRAE which along with PAIGC and FRELIMO reportedly told Senegal's President Leopold Senghor they are willing to accept a ten-year phase-out of Portuguese rule and membership in a Luso-African Commonwealth. After a decade of war with African "savagery" and "terrorism," the future bodes ill for a settler-nationalist compromise. Instead of a settlement with African nationalists, the provincial assemblies, dominated by privileged and enfranchised European minorities, should be expected to rely on greater South African aid and perhaps to adopt some form of a racial separation policy.

While on the one hand the Azores agreement could furnish a means of respite to the hard-pressed Portuguese economy, it has stirred strong reaction in the United States. The Senate's attempted halt is only one part of a growing opposition to American economic and political connections with the white regimes of southern Africa. The 1972 Democratic party platform contained planks that called for the withdrawal of the South African sugar quota, sanctions against Rhodesia, cessation of military aid to Portugal and cancellation of the Nixon administration's promise of Export-Import Bank loans to Lisbon.

Yet the significant challenge to American foreign policy toward Portugal is coming from black Americans who feel a close affinity to the suppressed people of southern Africa. One prominent act of black protest of the Azores agreement was the resignation of Congressman Charles C. Diggs from his post as a member of the United States delegation to the United Nations General Assembly. Since his resignation, Diggs has maintained steady pressure on southern African issues.

At present, black opposition to American foreign policy is of limited effect, but the Jewish American experience suggests an apt analogy. Before World War II, American Jews exerted little influence on Middle East policy; since then their impact on the formulation of American-Israeli relations has been considerable. The day is not far off when black Americans will exercise meaningful pressure on foreign issues. Even now, the annual stockholders' meetings of some corporations with investments in southern Africa are beset with vociferous critics. Gulf Oil's profitable operation in Cabinda (Angola) has been singled out by the American Committee on Africa as an example of American corporate complicity in Portuguese colonialism. The newly formed

Committee of Concerned Blacks and the African Heritage Studies Association are dedicated to expanding black awareness of conditions in southern Africa and American financial involvement on the side of the European governments.

Along with funding black American community groups, the Interreligious Foundation for Community Organizations began in June, 1972, to make grants of \$4,000 to southern African nationalist movements. At the very least, it can be expected that black Americans and their sympathizers will increase the amount and diversity of aid to nationalist forces in Africa in the short run. By linking their destiny with that of non-Europeans in Angola, Mozambique and Guinea-Bissau, they insure in the longer run a radical departure in American policy toward Portugal. For public officials to ignore the convictions of black Americans is to court disaster by escalating America's internal racial tensions.

CONCLUSION

Caught between advancing African nationalism and growing South African intervention, Portugal can no longer count on a permanent stay in Africa. As Lisbon's authority ebbs and its attention is drawn to Europe, the colonies will become independent. Much less certain is the form independence will take.

Guinea-Bissau possesses the most favorable conditions for African majority rule, but the territories in southern Africa present no such certainty. Negotiations with the African nationalists could provoke the army and ultra-right to action in Portugal and enhance the possibility of a Rhodesian "solution" in Angola and Mozambique. A probable outcome is partition between African nationalist and European settlers with South Africa's active assistance. In both territories, the mineral-rich areas and coastal regions could fall to white home-rule with the less valuable interior enclaves going to nationalist parties. In the scramble, Rhodesia could seek a corridor through Mozambique to the Indian Ocean. Rather than stability, partition fosters conditions for the entrenchment of settler rule, protracted conflict, and further deterioration of African living conditions.

Under attack from Communist-trained and supplied guerrillas, the white regimes can call for Western help, threatening to confront the world with another Vietnam-like situation with the added dimension of race war. Portugal's fortunes in Africa are changing and the dangers for the world are readily apparent.

African discontent, namely, the future of the franc zone. In Upper Volta, Pompidou said relatively little that could be deemed as a concrete proposal. As early as January, 1972, the President of Niger had asked the French government for a reconsideration of the whole difficult question of monetary reform. But as late as November, the President of France was using the old stick and carrot formula in Upper Volta. He agreed that the system should become more flexible. But he also reasserted that the Bank of France could only go on supporting the CFA franc—the currency of the African part of the zone—if its members continued to abide by the rules. He again said that his government was unwilling to impose conditions on those who did not wish to continue to bask in the warm glow of French cooperation.

But later in November, in Togo, Pompidou's hand was forced. President Eyadema apparently surprised his French guest by producing a powerful speech at a formal dinner. Eyadema demanded the complete convertibility of the CFA franc with the French franc. Off guard, Pompidou counterblasted in plain words. France, he said, would consider all demands for reform made by the African members of the franc zone if they were presented as *African* demands; the French-supported CFA franc was the currency of a region rather than the currency of a single country. Proposals for change in the system would be entertained if presented by African CFA-using states as a whole. On parity, Pompidou wielded the biggest stick of all; going right to the heart of the controversy, he stressed that parity was a question for France alone. France supported and guaranteed the CFA franc and without that support there would be no CFA franc.

Although there is controversy about whether Eyadema exceeded his brief in going as far as he did, there can be no doubt as to the impact of the sharp dinner-table clash. Despite efforts on both sides to smooth things over, Eyadema had said what was on the minds of many heads of state. Telegrams of support flooded into Lome. Pompidou could continue to pretend that the affairs of the franc zone and the question of parity were matters for France alone, but it was clearly no longer so simple as that. As if on cue, less than a week later Mauretania actually withdrew from the zone, set up her own currency and called France's bluff.

The African attack on the franc zone is double-headed. First, the French press has been much exercised over the "insult" to the President and to the zone itself. The franc lies at the heart of the matter, both concretely and symbolically. But second, and more important, such an assault (although this description goes far beyond the really quite restrained criticisms made by African heads of states) nibbles at the very roots of French "control" in ex-French Africa. African members of the zone are inevitably subordinates in the relationship. Although the monetary agree-

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ship," they were similarly cagey over the key area of

ments clearly provide for consultation, for example, African states were not consulted either before the devaluation of the franc in 1969 or before the introduction of the dual exchange rate in 1971.

What lies beneath the surface of African discontent and French attempts to "patch things up" is a much more profound set of problems. Many of the once mutually advantageous elements of the "special relationship" have been overtaken by events and have become redundant. In particular, the old imperial trading system based on preference and guaranteed prices has been superseded for the most part by the rules of the European Economic Community's Yaounde Convention with the associate states. Price subsidies for many tropical products ended abruptly, and a number of states, perhaps most dramatically Senegal, suffered grievously. On top of this, with panels of the French umbrella removed, Francophone African states have felt the full draft of the developed world's inflation. The terms of trade and in particular the spiralling costs of those items African states must purchase from the West have affected even comparatively well endowed states like the Ivory Coast. On top of all this, they have suffered from the devaluation of the franc. Lowering the costs of their products overseas does not mean necessarily that they can sell more if they cannot also increase their production. And, of course, the increased cost of plants, purchased from the developed world, is a positive bar to development.

Because of such problems, they have to cope with strong domestic criticisms of their comparative failures which, with some justification, point to France as a major cause of their slow rates of development. The palmy days of African subservience to France are clearly over and, whatever the outcome of the French election of 1973, it is clear that France's African policy will have to be overhauled. As it stands, Pompidou's grand tours appear to be the last kicks of an old policy, rather than, as he pretended, the first kicks of a new one.

POLITICAL STABILITY IN EAST AFRICA

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"tribalism, nepotism and utter selfishness" within KANU were responsible for delaying its reorganization, and that the party had become virtually nonexistent.

Although Kenyatta indicated soon afterward that election dates would be announced shortly, the difficulty in scheduling them illustrated a long recognized problem in the Kenyan system—the dominance of personalities and individual ambitions over orderly

processes of institution-building.⁶ At present, Kenyatta is able to resolve disputes on the strength of his personality. However, reliance on widely respected ground rules rather than on the President for settling factional disputes would probably benefit the country in the long run.

ZAMBIA

Zambia is usually grouped with the nations of "Central Africa." However, as rail and road links with Tanzania, built by the Chinese and the Americans respectively, are completed, Zambia will turn increasingly towards East Africa. Her ties with this area will be strengthened even further if Zambia joins the East African Community, as has already been discussed by the governments involved.

As with her neighbors to the north, Zambia's political institutions are still in a state of flux. President Kenneth Kaunda announced in 1972 that Zambia would adopt a *de jure* one-party system, with primary elections to be held within the ruling United National Independence party (UNIP). Over the years, the government has tolerated the opposition of the African National Congress, but has generally suppressed other attempts to organize opposition parties.

It was apparently the formation of the United Progressive party (UPP) in August, 1971, that precipitated Kaunda's decision to give in to long-standing pressures and appoint a commission to work out the details for a single-party system. UPP was headed by former Vice President Simon Kapwepwe. Drawing on former sources of support for UNIP when the ruling party was having difficulties anyway, UPP constituted a serious threat to UNIP. Not surprisingly, detention of UPP officials began almost immediately after its formation. Kapwepwe himself was detained and UPP was banned in February, 1972.

The transition to a single-party state will not be easily made. In Zambia, UNIP has not attracted the solid support that TANU has in Tanzania, and it is unlikely that constitutional changes will eliminate Zambia's sectional and personal splits. The banning of opposition parties, then, will have the effect of either transforming differences previously manifested through party competition into intra-party factional disputes (which would actually weaken the party by making it less unified), or suppressing all legitimate channels of peaceful dissent. Already, the treatment of opposition parties has given rise to several bombing incidents, one directed at Kaunda himself. If the UNIP government begins to rely increasingly on coercion rather than on popular recognition of its legitimacy to obtain compliance in certain sections of the country, it will encourage the use of violence as a tactic of dissent.

The future of East Africa will have an impact on the liberation movements in white-ruled Africa. This

⁶ John J. Okumu, "Charisma and Politics in Kenya: Notes and Comments on the Problems of Kenya's Party Leadership," *East Africa Journal*, 5 (February 1968), 9-16.

is particularly true of Tanzania and Zambia, which have taken militant stands and are close geographically to the problems of southern Africa. The development of stable, institutionalized political structures and the extension of economic cooperation will strengthen the area and thereby increase the amount of encouragement and aid that can be directed to the south. On the other hand, if East Africa enters an era of political turmoil and economic stagnation, the states in the area will become weaker and increasingly vulnerable to outside manipulation. For the immediate future, the direction of party politics in Kenya and Zambia, as much as any single factor, will probably determine the prospects for political stability in the region.

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with Israel and then with the Arab states, has also provided a thought-provoking illustration of the potentially harmful consequences for black African states of too close an involvement in the quarrels of others.

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Ambrose Zwane, the Ngwane National Liberatory Congress (NNLC), winning its first seats, indicated that its stronger policy against South Africa and its more professional international stance may have a growing following in Swaziland.¹⁰ Although this could cause problems in the future, for the time being it seems reasonable to assume that those who favor accommodation with South Africa will remain in power and that this will help further to insulate the republic from the winds of change.

At the same time, the more ambitious scheme for extending South African hegemony elsewhere in Africa recently suffered a series of setbacks. South African efforts at "dialogue" were voted down by the Organization of African Unity; two governments, one in Ghana, the other in the Malagasy Republic, which had favored greater diplomatic interaction, were overthrown. South Africa thus remains on the defensive and, given the constellation of forces operative in Africa north of the Zambesi, she is likely to remain so.

SOUTH AFRICA AND ZIMBABWE

One concern which demands South African attention and possible involvement is Zimbabwe (Rhodesia).

During the past year, the Africans overwhelmingly opposed the proposed settlement of the peace commission which sought to reconcile the demands of the British government with those of the breakaway regime of Ian Smith. As a result of opposition, the accord was dropped and Rhodesia's status remains in limbo. The Africans clearly did not trust the Smith regime to guarantee their rights nor to supervise any transition to African majority rule. On balance, considering that the government came to power by opposing these principles and declared its unilateral independence in order to avoid following them, African skepticism of the Rhodesian government seems well-founded.

The Smith government, which has thus far managed to escape too serious consequences of its independence, is currently facing a major threat. As the war in nearby Mozambique drags on into its ninth year, the forces of the *Frente de Libertação de Moçambique* have opened a new front opposite the border of Rhodesia. Previously, their guerrilla activities had been confined to the northern province of Cabo Delgado, Niassa and Tete (site of the proposed Cahora Bassa dam) but, by late 1972, the insurgents were operating in Manica and Sofala. If these activities intensify and Rhodesia's lines of communication to the port of Beira are threatened, the government may be forced into action. If it does, it may need South Africa assistance. South Africa, with a yearly defense budget of \$470 million, stands as the bulwark for the white redoubt, and is the only government able to pay the costs of counterinsurgency in this area.

In the event of a further deterioration in the Portuguese position in Mozambique, the South Africans might intervene there. Already talks have been held among the leaders of the three countries, and both South Africa's Prime Minister, John Vorster, and the Rhodesian Minister of Defense, Jack Howman, have indicated that a joint South African-Rhodesian force might have to be used if the Portuguese were unable to control the area so vital to Rhodesians. The African nationalists have long claimed that South African police and army units were in action around Cohara Bassa, but this has been repeatedly denied. Were South Africa to become visibly and dramatically involved in the struggle for Mozambique, this might give heart to those Africans who wish to liberate Zimbabwe and South Africa but whose current operations are limited.

Much of the above remains speculation and conjecture. The present realities indicate that the South African government is firmly in control and pursuing its policies with vigor and dispatch, undeterred by African and world opinion and unchecked by internal opposition. For the foreseeable future, despite the appearance of change and flux, the revolutionary fields lie fallow indeed.

¹⁰ The development of politics in Swaziland is covered in C. P. Potholm, *Swaziland: The Dynamics of Political Modernization* (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1972).

CEASE-FIRE IN VIETNAM

(Continued from page 129)

ment of the cease-fire throughout South Vietnam, when the Four-Party Joint Military Commission has ended its activities.

¶Article 3 (b), regarding the cease-fire between the two South Vietnamese parties.

¶Article 3 (c), regarding the cease-fire between all parties in South Vietnam, when the Four-Party Joint Military Commission has ended its activities.

¶Article 7, regarding the prohibition of the introduction of troops into South Vietnam and all other provisions of this article.

¶Article 8 (c), regarding the question of the return of Vietnamese civilian personnel captured and detained in South Vietnam.

¶Article 9 (b), regarding the free and democratic general elections in South Vietnam.

¶Article 13, regarding the reduction of the military effectives of the two South Vietnamese parties and the demobilization of the troops being reduced.

The International Commission of Control and Supervision shall form control teams for carrying out its tasks. The two South Vietnamese parties shall agree immediately on the location and operation of these teams. The two South Vietnamese parties will facilitate their operation.

(d) The International Commission of Control and Supervision shall be composed of representatives of four countries: Canada, Hungary, Indonesia and Poland. The chairmanship of this commission will rotate among the members for specific periods to be determined by the commission.

(e) The International Commission of Control and Supervision shall carry out its tasks in accordance with the principle of respect for the sovereignty of South Vietnam.

(f) The International Commission of Control and Supervision shall operate in accordance with the principle of consultations and unanimity.

(g) The International Commission of Control and Supervision shall begin operating when a cease-fire comes into force in Vietnam. As regards the provisions in Article 18 (b) concerning the four parties, the International Commission of Control and Supervision shall end its activities when the commission's tasks of control and supervision regarding these provisions have been fulfilled. As regards the provisions in Article 18 (c) concerning the two South Vietnamese parties, the International Commission of Control and Supervision shall end its activities on the request of the government formed after the general elections in South Vietnam provided for in Article 9 (b).

(h) The four parties shall agree immediately on the organization, means of activity and expenditures of the International Commission of Control and Supervision. The relationship between the international commission and the international conference will be agreed upon by the International Conference.

ARTICLE 19

The parties agree on the convening of an international conference within 30 days of the signing of this agreement to acknowledge the signed agreements; to guarantee the ending of the war, the maintenance of peace in Vietnam, the respect of the Vietnamese people's fundamental national rights and the South Vietnamese people's right to self-determination; and to contribute to and guarantee peace in Indochina.

The United States and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, on behalf of the parties participating in the Paris con-

ference on Vietnam, will propose to the following parties that they participate in this international conference: the People's Republic of China, the Republic of France, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom, the four countries of the International Commission of Control and Supervision, and the Secretary General of the United Nations, together with the parties participating in the Paris conference on Vietnam.

Chapter VII

Regarding Cambodia and Laos

ARTICLE 20

(a) The parties participating in the Paris conference on Vietnam shall strictly respect the 1954 Geneva Agreements on Cambodia and the 1962 Geneva Agreements on Laos, which recognized the Cambodian and the Lao peoples' fundamental national rights, i.e., the independence, sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity of these countries. The parties shall respect the neutrality of Cambodia and Laos.

The parties participating in the Paris conference on Vietnam undertake to refrain from using the territory of Cambodia and the territory of Laos to encroach on the sovereignty and security of one another and of other countries.

(b) Foreign countries shall put an end to all military activities in Cambodia and Laos, shall totally withdraw from and refrain from reintroducing into these two countries troops, military advisers and military personnel, armaments, munitions and war material.

(c) The internal affairs of Cambodia and Laos shall be settled by the people of each of these countries without foreign interference.

(d) The problems existing between the Indochinese countries shall be settled by the Indochinese parties on the basis of respect for each other's independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity, and noninterference in each other's internal affairs.

Chapter VIII

The Relationship Between the United States and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam

ARTICLE 21

The United States anticipates that this agreement will usher in an era of reconciliation with the Democratic Republic of Vietnam as with all the peoples of Indochina. In pursuance of its traditional policy, the United States will contribute to healing the wounds of war and to postwar reconstruction of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and throughout Indochina.

ARTICLE 22

The ending of the war, the restoration of peace in Vietnam and the strict implementation of this agreement will create conditions for establishing a new, equal and mutually beneficial relationship between the United States and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam on the basis of respect for each other's independence and sovereignty and noninterference in each other's internal affairs. At the same time this will insure stable peace in Vietnam and contribute to the preservation of lasting peace in Indochina and Southeast Asia.

Chapter IX

Other Provisions

ARTICLE 23

This agreement shall enter into force upon signature by

plenipotentiary representatives of the parties participating in the Paris Conference on Vietnam. All the parties concerned shall strictly implement this agreement and its Protocols.

Done in Paris this 27th day of January, 1973, in Vietnamese and English. The Vietnamese and English texts are official and equally authentic.

For the Government of the United States of America

WILLIAM P. ROGERS

Secretary of State

For the Government of the Republic of Vietnam

TRAN VAN LAM

Minister for Foreign Affairs

For the Government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam

NGUYEN DUY TRINH

Minister for Foreign Affairs

For the Provisional Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South Vietnam

NGUYEN THI BINH

Minister for Foreign Affairs

2-Party Version

Agreement on Ending the War and Restoring Peace in Vietnam

The Government of the United States of America, with the concurrence of the Government of the Republic of Vietnam,

The Government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, with the concurrence of the Provisional Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South Vietnam,

With a view to ending the war and restoring peace in Vietnam on the basis of respect for the Vietnamese people's fundamental national rights and the South Vietnamese people's right to self-determination, and to contributing to the consolidation of peace in Asia and the world,

Have agreed on the following provisions and undertake to respect and to implement them:

[Text of agreement Chapters I-VIII same as above]

Chapter IX

Other Provisions

The Paris agreement on Ending the War and Restoring Peace in Vietnam shall enter into force upon signature of this document by the Secretary of State of the Government of the United States of America and the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, and upon signature of a document in the same terms by the Secretary of State of the Government of the United States of America, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Government of the Republic of Vietnam, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Provisional Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South Vietnam. The agreement and the protocols to it shall be strictly implemented by all the parties concerned.

Done in Paris this 27th day of January, 1973, in Vietnamese and English. The Vietnamese and English texts are official and equally authentic.

For the Government of the United States of America

WILLIAM P. ROGERS

Secretary of State

For the Government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam

NGUYEN DUY TRINH

Minister for Foreign Affairs

BOOK REVIEWS

(Continued from page 126)

LOCAL ADMINISTRATION IN WEST AFRICA.

By RONALD WRAITH. (New York: The Africana Publishing Corporation, 1972. 236 pages and index, \$6.95.)

The author contrasts post-1970 political developments in anglophone West Africa, which he calls wholly African-devised, with the local governments of the 1950's and 1960's which were so strongly influenced by British concepts. O.E.S.

EMERGING NATIONALISM IN PORTUGUESE

AFRICA: DOCUMENTS. By RONALD H. CHILCOTE. (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1972. 646 pages, appendix, maps and index, \$25.00.)

The author feels that "nationalism as a concept . . . is a force in the Third World, which in all its manifestations provides a broad and powerful impetus toward development and society." He defines the forms this nationalism takes in Portuguese Africa, using voluminous documentation to illustrate his examples.

Each section of the book is introduced with a short background article. The selection of documents is well done, and many of the speeches of the nationalist movement leaders are extremely valuable for the student of the emerging nations of the Third World. Four excellent maps add greatly to the usefulness of the book. O.E.S.

UNITED STATES POLICY IN AFRICA

(Continued from page 101)

gressmen seem more effective when using direct, personal channels of communication within the administration than when they try to provide leadership in the legislature. Mr. Diggs, for example, deserves some credit for helping to persuade the State Department to send a permanent black Foreign Service Officer to Pretoria. But the White House also seems less receptive to the concerns of black Americans about African issues than was the case in previous administrations. President Nixon waited nearly a year before he met with a black congressional delegation, and black Americans in the administration are prudent in their public statements.

Another difficulty is that black groups seem less than fully united as a lobby for African affairs. Their model, the Jewish lobby, is a distant ideal: Jews are relatively more united and wealthy, whereas black Americans are disunited and poor. When Roy Wilkins, executive director of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP), told an audience in South Africa that withdrawing

private United States investments would not help the disenfranchised majorities in that country, he was subjected to strident verbal attacks from other black leaders and organizations in this country. (The NAACP dissociated itself from a tone of separatism in domestic affairs and from a call to "dismantle Israel.") Perhaps the best example of ineffectiveness concerns Senator McGee's sponsorship of the State Department effort to resume the ban against Rhodesian chromite. Although the Senate was debating the issue at the time of the African Liberation Day, McGee reported that he felt virtually no pressure from black Americans. Given the close vote on that issue (40 to 36), one wonders if a modest campaign or the inclusion of Capitol Hill on the march route would have made the difference between victory and defeat.

Black Americans can create and reinforce solidarity among themselves and can sensitize their black constituencies to African, particularly southern African, issues. This in itself would be an important achievement. When Charles Diggs, for instance, resigned in December, 1971, as a delegate to the United States mission to the United Nations to protest the administration decision to provide more aid to Portugal, he and his friends were reportedly surprised at the support his stand elicited from black American organizations. "I did it," explained Diggs, "for the more than 22 million Americans of African descent." There is an instrumental aspect of American leaders' embrace of African causes, and how this can be used to widen their support among the black community remains to be seen. At this time, there is little reason to believe that black Americans find it easier than other Americans to agree on the best policy toward Africa.

The United States government cannot and must not remain blind or insensitive to the human and political aspirations of others, especially if these coincide with time-honored American principles. In southern Africa, the great moral issue is a variant of self-determination, itself an outgrowth of the irreversible process of the political decolonization of the 1960's. For the United States, the moral issue concerns the extension of American principles to other parts of the world. This is not a new kind of issue; it remains one of the most intractable for any policymaker. It would be satisfying if this question could be settled by government fiat—either to accept a commitment to bring justice to the majorities of southern Africa, or to forget the whole thing and adopt pure pragmatism.

The vision of America's renovated and cleansed leadership dispensing justice, buttressed by the world's moral, diplomatic and other support, is appealing. Some call for such a vision to expiate past and present American sins. But there are also "realities": there is American public objection to another era of moral-

ism; there is the moot question of the availability, nature and effectiveness of worldwide support; there is the specter of American "imperialism" pursuing the best way to reap profit; there is the charge of colonialism and paternalism hurled at superpowers which want others to follow their footsteps; there is the possibility of enormous suffering visited upon the very people in whose name such a policy would be carried out; and there is, finally, the widely shared conviction that change can—or should—come only from inside the states of southern Africa.

Nevertheless, the new realism cannot be permitted to gallop away unchecked. It is also realistic to consider the climate of world opinion and to adjust to it. It is becoming increasingly clear that world opinion has tilted toward the Liberation Struggle against the remnants of colonialism. Apart from the symbolism of choosing Nairobi as the headquarters for the new United Nations Environmental Agency and of the United Nations Security Council's meeting in Addis Ababa, the trend is illustrated by the repeated censure and the isolation of the white-minority regimes of southern Africa, the recognition of African freedom fighters as representatives of Portugal's African territories, U.N. Secretary General Kurt Waldheim's efforts on behalf of Namibia (Southwest Africa), and the General Assembly resolution recognizing armed rebellion against colonialism as legitimate. It is also realistic to consider American prestige on these issues, and to recognize that the American star has dimmed considerably in the last few years.

For top administrative leaders not to follow through on an earlier commitment to international moral and legal obligations, or to sell a few airplanes and locomotives to white-minority regimes tainted with universal opprobrium, or even to expand imports from Rhodesia beyond chromite, can hardly be related to the broader national interests of the United States. It is true that our foreign policy process is pluralistic *à outrance*, and that its components do not always yield to strict controls. Given the significance of the international issues involved and the effervescence of world public opinion about them, there should be a way to coordinate our policy and to view these departures from our commitments in a larger context.

In an interview a few days before his reelection, President Nixon stated: "I wouldn't want to leave the impression that . . . Africa will not get attention, because none of our present policies are going to be sacred cows. I am going to look at the . . . African policies to see how our programs can be improved in those areas." The impression that Africa has suffered from a lack of sufficient American attention is firmly anchored in recent American policy behavior. Now is the opportunity to take a second look, and to rescue that policy from the shadows to which it has been consigned.

THE MONTH IN REVIEW

A CURRENT HISTORY chronology covering the most important events of January, 1973, to provide a day-by-day summary of world affairs.

INTERNATIONAL

Arab League

(See also *Intl, Middle East*)

Jan. 31—It is reported that 18 Arab foreign and defense ministers ended their deadlocked conference in Cairo last night. At issue is Jordan's insistence that Palestinian commandos returning to Jordan accept strict controls: the guerrillas demand freedom of action. It is revealed that the delegates pledged \$190 million in financial aid for Syria.

Disarmament

Jan. 31—NATO and Warsaw Pact delegates open a meeting in Vienna to make preparations for talks later this year on mutual balanced troop reductions in Europe.

European Economic Community (Common Market)

Jan. 1—Great Britain, Ireland and Denmark formally become members of the European Economic Community

Middle East Crisis

(See also *Intl, Arab League; Syria*)

Jan. 8—Israeli planes strike Syrian targets in reprisal for Palestinian guerrilla attacks, staged from Syria, on the Israeli-occupied Golan Heights.

Jan. 10—Syrian government sources report that Israeli raids on the town of Dael 2 days ago resulted in the deaths of over 500 civilians; the Israelis claimed that they shot down 6 Syrian MIG's and destroyed tanks and radar stations.

Jan. 12—In Cairo, Palestinian guerrilla leaders end 6 days of debate; they reelect Yasir Arafat, leader of Al Fatah (the principal terrorist organization) as chairman of the executive committee of the Palestine National Council. The Council is the parliamentary arm of the Palestine Liberation Front (the main political organization of the rebel groups). A communiqué is issued following today's meeting in which the 155-member Council vows to continue to fight until Palestine is liberated.

Jan. 23—It is reported that the Syrian Army has told Palestinian nationalist rebels that they may not carry out any operations on Israeli territory without the approval of Syrian military authorities.

Jan. 29—It is reported that 18 Arab foreign and defense ministers have been meeting in Cairo at the

headquarters of the Arab League for the past 2 days. They have received the consent of King Hussein of Jordan to include the Jordanian front in Arab military operations; the Jordanian front will be placed under the command of Egypt's military commander in chief and war minister, General Ahmed Ismail.

North Atlantic Treaty Organization

(See also *Disarmament; U.S.S.R.*)

Jan. 7—U.S. Secretary of State William P. Rogers reads a letter from U.S. President Richard M. Nixon to the foreign ministers of the NATO countries at their meeting in Brussels; President Nixon asserts that the U.S. "will maintain" its forces in Europe and will only cut back if "there is reciprocal action from our adversaries."

United Nations

(See also *Rhodesia*)

Jan. 7—It is reported that John F. Thomas, director general of the Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration, has met with U.N. and U.S. officials to discuss the plight of 1,800 stateless Asians, ousted from Uganda last fall, who are still waiting in European camps to be resettled.

Jan. 16—The Security Council decides to accept Panama's invitation and meet in Panama City, March 15–21, to discuss matters of concern to Latin America. It is expected that the dispute between the U.S. and Panama over the Panama Canal Zone will be brought up.

Jan. 29—Zambia's chief delegate to the U.N., Paul Lusaka, asks the Security Council to condemn Rhodesia; he defends his government's support of Rhodesia's insurgent movement.

War in Indochina

MILITARY RECORD

Jan. 4—The U.S. command reports that supply routes and other targets in North Vietnam below the 20th parallel were attacked yesterday by U.S. planes.

The South Vietnamese command reports 81 incidents yesterday in which North Vietnamese and Vietcong forces initiated attacks against South Vietnam.

Jan. 6—It is reported that yesterday officials in Haiphong told journalists that U.S. raids had destroyed the industrial area of Haiphong. In addition, the

- 15,000 tons of bombs dropped on Haiphong killed 305 persons, wounded 882, and razed 5,800 homes.
- Jan. 9—U.S. officials report that U.S. pilots are allowed to fly above the 20th parallel in pursuit of North Vietnamese jets that attempt to intercept U.S. planes attacking North Vietnam below the 20th parallel, the northernmost limit for U.S. bombing raids set by President Richard M. Nixon on Dec. 30, 1972.
- Jan. 18—The U.S. command reports an increased number of air strikes against enemy positions in South Vietnam.
- Jan. 28—U.S. officials declare that 100 American planes, including B-52 bombers, have bombed suspected Communist positions and supply lines in Laos after the Vietnam cease-fire became effective.
- Jan. 30—It is reported that South Vietnam and the Vietcong have accused each other of multiple cease-fire violations. An American official declares that the fighting is winding down.

PEACE NEGOTIATIONS

(See also *U.S., Foreign Policy*)

- Jan. 4—The North Vietnamese, Vietcong, U.S. and South Vietnamese delegates to the Paris peace talks confer.
- Jan. 5—At a White House breakfast, President Nixon tells congressional leaders that he is "determined to pursue a course that would lead to the proper kind of settlement."
- Jan. 6—Le Duc Tho, the North Vietnamese negotiator at the private Paris peace talks, arrives for the resumption of negotiations scheduled for January 8; the talks were broken off on December 13, 1973. He declares that "the responsibility" for peace "rests entirely on the United States."
- Jan. 7—Henry A. Kissinger, presidential adviser on national security affairs, arrives in Paris for the resumption of the private peace negotiations; he declares that "President Nixon has sent me back to make one more major effort to conclude the negotiations."
- Jan. 8—Kissinger and Tho resume talks.
- Jan. 11—Continuing their daily meetings, Kissinger and Tho hold a 6-hour secret session. It is reported that negotiations cover the central issue of whether North and South Vietnam are to be reunited or remain divided.
- Jan. 13—Kissinger leaves Paris to report to President Nixon on the negotiations. The North Vietnamese delegation issues a statement declaring that the private Kissinger-Tho talks "have made progress."
- Jan. 15—Following talks between Kissinger and President Nixon, White House press secretary Ronald L. Ziegler announces the suspension of all bombing, mining and shelling against North Vietnam because of "progress" made in the Paris peace talks. It is reported that last night President Nixon ordered General Alexander M. Haig, Jr., to fly to Saigon to confer with President Nguyen Van Thieu of South Vietnam about the Kissinger-Tho talks.
- Jan. 16—Haig confers in Saigon with Thieu.
- Jan. 18—White House press secretary Ronald Ziegler reads a joint U.S.-North Vietnamese statement declaring that Kissinger and Tho will meet in Paris on January 23, to complete "the text of an agreement" to end the war.
- Jan. 19—*The New York Times* reports that General Haig left Saigon yesterday after obtaining President Thieu's approval of the cease-fire accord in general, but with disagreement remaining on certain procedural issues relating to implementing the cease-fire.
- Jan. 21—General Haig returns to the U.S.
- Jan. 22—Kissinger returns to Paris for talks with Le Duc Tho. It is announced that they will meet at the International Conference Center rather than at private homes as in the past.
- Jan. 23—In a televised address to the American people, President Nixon announces that Kissinger and Tho earlier today initialed an agreement to end the war and restore peace in Vietnam. The agreement will be formally signed on Saturday, January 27; an internationally supervised cease-fire will take effect that day. Within 60 days after the signing, all American prisoners will have been released. Also within the same 60-day period, all U.S. troops will be withdrawn from South Vietnam. President Nixon states that the accord satisfies his demands for "peace with honor," and declares that the accord has the support of the Republic of South Vietnam, which "the U.S. will continue to recognize . . . as the sole legitimate government of South Vietnam." No mention is made of the presence of 145,000 North Vietnamese forces in the South. (For the text of the cease-fire agreement see pp. 127ff.)
- Jan. 24—At a 90-minute news conference, Kissinger declares that the U.S. has achieved a "fair and just" settlement in Vietnam. He states that the U.S. has been led to expect a cease-fire in Laos and an end to the fighting in Cambodia. An international conference on Vietnam will be held within 30 days, as provided in the agreement. The agreement also stipulates that both North and South shall respect the demilitarized zone.
- Le Duc Tho, at a press conference in Paris, declares that the Vietnam accord is "a great victory for the Vietnamese people"; he says that the accord is "basically the same" as that reached in October, 1972.
- President Thieu, in a broadcast to the Vietnam people, declares that he considers the Paris peace accord a cease-fire arrangement, but that it does not guarantee a lasting peace.

Jan. 25—In Paris, it is reported that Cambodia will end offensive military operations because it has been assured that an understanding reached during the Paris peace talks will extend the cease-fire to Cambodia and Laos.

Jan. 27—In Paris, the U.S., North Vietnamese, Vietcong and South Vietnamese delegates sign a cease-fire agreement to end the war and restore peace in South Vietnam. It becomes effective at 7:00 P.M. E.S.T.

Warsaw Pact

(See also *Disarmament; U.S.S.R.*)

Jan. 15—Foreign Ministers of the 7 member states of Communist East Europe gather in Moscow to discuss East-West relations.

Jan. 16—The 2-day meeting to develop a joint strategy for a European security conference ends.

AUSTRALIA

(See also *New Zealand*)

Jan. 4—The U.S. Ambassador, Walter L. Rice, delivers a protest for the second time to the Australian government over the maritime unions' boycott of American shipping to protest renewed U.S. bombing of North Vietnam.

Immigration Minister Albert Jaime Grassby discloses that Australia has modified its immigration policy to end racial discrimination against non-whites.

Jan. 9—The Australian Maritime Union ends its 2-week boycott of U.S. shipping.

Jan. 17—Prime Minister Gough Whitlam holds a news conference with Michael Somare, chief minister of Papua New Guinea. Prime Minister Gough Whitlam announces that the date for granting independence to Papua New Guinea will be worked out with the government there. Somare has objected to a proposal for granting independence sometime in 1974 because conditions indicate that the country may not be ready.

BELGIUM

Jan. 21—The Socialist, Social Christian and Liberal parties agree to form a coalition Cabinet led by Premier-designate Edmond Leburton.

BURMA

Jan. 20—It is reported that a Chinese-supported rebel army (estimated at 4,000–5,000 troops) has seized territory in northeast Burma near the Chinese border.

CAMBODIA

(See also *Intl. War in Indochina*)

Jan. 11—Terrorists fire rockets at the National Assembly in Phnompenh.

Jan. 27—From his exile in China, Prince Norodom

Sihanouk of Cambodia declares that his rebel troops will continue to fight against President Lon Nol's government despite the Vietnam cease-fire.

CANADA

Jan. 5—The House of Commons unanimously approves a resolution condemning recent U.S. bombing of the Hanoi-Haiphong area.

CHILE

Jan. 12—The government of President Salvador Allende Gossens acts to control wheat sales as part of a rationing program.

CHINA, PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF

Jan. 1—*Hsinhua* (official press agency) reports that grain production in 1972 dropped to 240 million metric tons; in 1971, it totaled 250 million metric tons.

Jan. 15—It is announced that the Chinese government has agreed to release an Australian journalist, Francis James, who disappeared in China over 3 years ago.

ECUADOR

Jan. 20—A U.S. fishing boat is seized by Ecuador 40 miles off the Galapagos Islands and 600 miles from the Ecuadorean coast.

EGYPT

Jan. 4—It is reported that university campuses are empty following the government's decision to suspend classes. Yesterday, students and police fought at Cairo University.

ETHIOPIA

Jan. 17—French President Georges Pompidou arrives in Ethiopia and is greeted by Emperor Haile Selassie.

FINLAND

Jan. 18—The Parliament approves legislation extending President Urho Kekkonen's term of office, scheduled to expire March 1, 1974, for another 4 years.

FRANCE

(See also *U.S.S.R.*)

Jan. 9—President Georges Pompidou asserts that the forthcoming visits of 6 Socialist heads of government to Paris to attend a meeting of leaders of the Socialist International are "an intrusion into French internal politics." He declares that the visiting leaders "will have no official contacts with French authorities." They include Premier Golda Meir of Israel, Premier Olof Palme of Sweden, Premier Anker Joergensen of Denmark, Premier Kalevi Sorsa of Finland, Premier Trygve Bratteli of Norway, and Chancellor Bruno Kreisky of Austria.

Jan. 13—Socialist leaders from 18 countries attend the opening of a 2-day meeting of the Socialist International. Police disperse demonstrators protesting the presence of Israeli Premier Meir.

GERMANY, FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF (West)

Jan. 23—West German Chancellor Willy Brandt confers in Paris with French President Georges Pompidou.

GHANA

Jan. 13—Colonel Ignatius Kutu Acheampong announces that the first anniversary marking the overthrow of the government of former Prime Minister Kofi A. Busia will be marked by the release of 67 political prisoners.

HAITI

Jan. 24—The U.S. Ambassador, Clinton E. Knox, is released unharmed by gunmen in exchange for 12 Haitian prisoners, a promise of safe conduct to Mexico, and a ransom of \$70,000. It is reported that the plane with the prisoners and 3 kidnappers has arrived safely in Mexico City.

INDIA

Jan. 2—In Andhra Pradesh, police shoot and kill at least 2 people when they try to break up demonstrations demanding independence for Andhra Pradesh.

Jan. 17.—Food Minister Fakhruddin Ali Ahmed declares that India is suffering from the worst drought in a decade; some 2 million tons of food grains will be imported.

Jan. 18—Prime Minister Indira Gandhi places Andhra Pradesh under the central government's control; the state government collapsed because of separatist demonstrations.

IRELAND

Jan. 5—Prime Minister John Lynch, on a trip to the U.S. to solicit American investment in Ireland, confers in Washington, D.C., with U.S. President Richard Nixon.

Jan. 11—The president of Sinn Fein (the political movement of the Provisional Wing of the Irish Republican Army), Ruairi O'Bradaigh, is sentenced to 6 months in jail after being tried in a Dublin court.

ISRAEL

(See also *Intl, Middle East; France*)

Jan. 8—Israeli President Zalman Shazar ends a 5-day visit to the U.S.

Jan. 15—Premier Golda Meir of Israel confers in the Vatican with Pope Paul VI on Middle East questions.

Jan. 17—Premier Meir visits Ivory Coast President Félix Houphouët-Boigny at his residence in Geneva,

to discuss deteriorating relations with black African states.

ITALY

Jan. 3—The provincial Labor Office orders the oil refinery, petro-chemical plants and other enterprises in Porto Marghera, the industrial port of Venice, to furnish gas masks to 50,000 workers.

Jan. 12—Pressuring for social reform, the 3 federated major trade union groups call a one-day general strike during which millions of Italians walk off their jobs. In addition, 180,000 postal, telegraph and telephone workers begin a 2-day strike for higher pay.

JORDAN

(See *Intl, Middle East*)

KOREA, PEOPLE'S DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF (North)

Jan. 18—At the 334th meeting of the Korea Military Armistice Commission, North Korean delegates list 5 demands for reunification, including the evacuation of all U.S. troops from South Korea.

KUWAIT

Jan. 8—The Kuwait government signs a participation agreement under which 2 oil companies agree to give Kuwait an initial 25 per cent interest in existing concessions on its territory; over a 10-year period, Kuwait's interest will grow to 51 per cent.

LAOS

(See also *Intl, War in Indochina*)

Jan. 9—Government and Pathet Lao delegates meet to discuss a peace settlement. It is reported that the government's military position is steadily growing worse.

Jan. 10—A strong Pathet Lao and North Vietnamese attack on Saravane, a southern Laotian town, forces government troops to withdraw.

Jan. 31—In a new series of secret peace talks, Communist-led Pathet Lao and Laotian government delegates confer on arranging a cease-fire in Laos.

MADAGASCAR

Jan. 13—In the port of Tamatave, the government lifts the state of siege imposed one month ago because of rioting.

MOROCCO

Jan. 13—11 Air Force officers and non-commissioned officers are executed for their role in the attempted assassination of King Hassan II in August, 1972.

NEW ZEALAND

Jan. 22—Prime Minister Norman Kirk ends a 2-day conference with Australian Prime Minister Gough Whitlam.

PHILIPPINES

Jan. 2—President Ferdinand E. Marcos calls Muslim leaders to a conference tomorrow to discuss a peace settlement for the southern Philippines, where heavy fighting has erupted between government forces and rebels.

Jan. 3—President Marcos tells 300 Muslim leaders from the southern island of Mindanao that he will grant economic benefits and a selective amnesty to bring peace to the area. He orders the end of military operations there, except for defensive measures.

Jan. 7—In a radio and television address, President Marcos announces the return to more stringent measures. He revokes the directive permitting free debate on a proposed new constitution.

Jan. 11—It is reported that newly organized and government supervised citizens' assemblies meeting since yesterday indicate that there is strong support for the martial law administration headed by Marcos and for the proposed new constitution granting dictatorial powers to Marcos for an indefinite length of time. The citizens' assemblies are participating in a kind of national referendum.

Jan. 17—President Marcos proclaims a new constitution, and the indefinite continuation of martial law. He orders the suspension of an interim assembly that would have served as a legislature under the new constitution. Marcos continues to hold the title of President under the old constitution and gains the title of Premier under the new constitution establishing a parliamentary system. An assembly of national representatives at the presidential palace approves Marcos' actions.

PORTUGAL

Portuguese Guinea

Jan. 21—President Sékou Touré of Guinea announces that Amílcar Cabral, an African leader in the struggle to overcome white supremacy, was assassinated in front of his home in Conakry last night "by the poisoned hands of imperialism and Portuguese colonialism." Forces under Cabral have claimed control of over half the territory of Portuguese Guinea in West Africa. Cabral was president of the African party for the Independence of Guinea and Cape Verde.

RHODESIA

(See also *Intl, U.N.; Zambia*)

Jan. 9—The Rhodesian government orders that the border frontier with Zambia be closed because the Zambian government has ignored requests to clamp down on rebels staging raids against Rhodesia from bases in Zambia.

Jan. 19—The government publishes new state of emergency rules allowing white provincial commissioners to impose collective fines on African communities

whose members have helped anti-white rebels. The fines may be imposed without court hearings and without allowing those affected to defend themselves. The government also announces that Zambian troops today fired at Rhodesian forces and a South African police boat on the Zambezi River.

SYRIA

(See *Intl, Middle East*)

THAILAND

Jan. 19—Premier Thanom Kittikachorn and other officials meet with U.S. General Alexander M. Haig, Jr., for a briefing on the Paris peace talks.

U.S.S.R., THE

(See also *Intl, Warsaw Pact*)

Jan. 3—*Izvestia* (government newspaper) publishes a decree issued by the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet; it imposes stiff penalties for airplane hijackings.

Jan. 11—Communist Party Chairman Leonid I. Brezhnev greets visiting French President Georges Pompidou at the airport near Minsk.

Jan. 16—Luna 21, an unmanned spacecraft, successfully lands on the moon; a remote control roving moon vehicle, known as a Lunokhod, begins operation.

Jan. 19—*Tass* (Soviet press agency) makes public a Soviet note sent to NATO countries, asking that the East-West talks on troop reductions be expanded to include other interested nations. The talks are scheduled to begin January 31. It is reported that yesterday the Soviet Union and four of its allies accepted the West's invitation to attend the conference.

Jan. 20—It is reported that in the latest issue of the *Bulletin* of the Supreme Soviet, dated December 27, 1972, the text of the decree placing an education tax on those wishing to emigrate is published.

Jan. 30—Communist Party Chairman Leonid I. Brezhnev speaks at a banquet honoring Le Duc Tho, North Vietnam's principal negotiator at the Paris peace talks; he hails the cease-fire agreement in Vietnam.

UNITED KINGDOM

Great Britain

Jan. 10—Thousands of British civil servants participate in work stoppages to protest pay losses under the 90-day wage and price freeze.

Jan. 17—Prime Minister Heath, at a televised news conference, announces a comprehensive anti-inflation program that would limit increases in prices, wages, rents and dividends following the end of the 90-day freeze. A new pay board and price commission will be established if the program receives parliamentary approval.

Northern Ireland

- Jan. 14—3 policemen are killed and 3 are injured by bomb explosions.
- Jan. 15—The British administration warns that tighter security measures may be imposed because of terrorist activities.
- Jan. 16—Sean MacStiofain, chief of the militant Provisional wing of the Irish Republican Army, ends a 58-day hunger strike.
- Jan. 28—In Londonderry, British troops subdue rioting teenagers following a peaceful demonstration in remembrance of "Bloody Sunday" on January 30, 1972, when 13 Roman Catholics were shot by British forces.
- Jan. 29—Two people are killed in Northern Ireland; part of a major shipyard is bombed and set on fire.

UNITED STATES

Civil Rights and Race Relations

- Jan. 8—Addressing the annual meeting of the N.A.A.C.P., executive director Roy Wilkins charges that American Negroes have been placed under a state of siege by the Nixon administration.
- Jan. 16—Secretary of Labor James D. Hodgson issues an order to the Bethlehem Steel Corporation to amend its "seniority system" because it discriminates against blacks at its Sparrows Point, Maryland, plant.
- Jan. 18—In a settlement worked out with 2 federal agencies, the American Telephone and Telegraph Company agrees to grant \$15 million in back pay and \$23 million a year in pay raises to women and minority group male employees against whom the company has discriminated.
- Jan. 24—In Memphis, Tennessee, a broad pupil transfer program goes into effect; thousands of white pupils fail to report to their assigned schools in the South Memphis slum area. It is reported that Memphis has had the most segregated school system in the South.

Economy

(See also *Industry*)

- Jan. 5—The Labor Department reports that the unemployment rate in December, 1972, remained at 5.2 per cent.
- Jan. 11—In a message to Congress, President Richard M. Nixon asks for a one-year extension of the Economic Stabilization Act, due to expire on April 30, 1973. He also announces Phase 3 of the economic stabilization program, under which mandatory controls on wages and prices will be replaced by "voluntary cooperation," except for food products, health care, and building construction. All federal rent controls are lifted. The Price Commission and Pay Board are abolished; some of their personnel will be incorporated into the Cost of Living

Council to help supervise wage and price increases.

Jan. 12—The Federal Reserve Board approves an increase in the discount rate from 4½ to 5 per cent at all Federal Reserve Banks.

- The New York Times* reports that labor officials have privately described the new Phase 3 of the anti-inflation program as a victory for AFL-CIO President George Meany; it was worked out in negotiations with Secretary of the Treasury George P. Shultz, in exchange for labor's promise to participate in the program. It is also reported that labor is pleased with the appointment of John T. Dunlop as director of the Cost of Living Council.
- Jan. 16—The U.S. Embassy in Moscow reports that U.S. exports to the Soviet Union reached \$449 million in the first 11 months of 1972, up from \$134 million for the same period in 1971.
- Jan. 18—The Commerce Department reports that in 1972 personal income of individuals and families totaled \$935.8 billion, an increase of \$74.4 billion over 1971.
- Jan. 19—The Commerce Department reports that the GNP, or total national output, rose 6.5 per cent in 1972; the GNP totaled \$1,152 billion.
- Jan. 23—The Labor Department reports that by the end of 1972 prices had risen 3.4 per cent over their 1971 level.
- Jan. 24—The Labor Department reports that the U.S. foreign trade deficit totaled \$6.4 billion for 1972.
- Jan. 30—In a message accompanying his annual economic report to Congress, President Nixon tells Congress that an expansionist economic period is anticipated; and that the problem will be preventing the expansion from turning into "an inflationary boom."

Foreign Policy

(See also *Intl, War in Indochina; Ireland; Yugoslavia*)

- Jan. 8—Speaking before the House Armed Services Committee, Defense Secretary Melvin Laird declares that \$5.3 billion worth of new equipment has been given to the South Vietnamese army to enable it to defend the country.
- Jan. 12—The General Electric Company and the Soviet Union sign an agreement in Moscow providing for joint development of electric-power generating technology.
- Jan. 14—Henry A. Kissinger, presidential adviser on national security affairs, reports to President Nixon on his 6 days of peace talks in Paris with Le Duc Tho, the North Vietnamese negotiator. President Nixon sends General Alexander M. Haig, Jr., to Saigon to consult with South Vietnamese President Nguyen Van Thieu.
- Jan. 19—Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird, at a farewell news conference, urges the U.S., China and

the U.S.S.R. to negotiate an agreement to limit future arms deliveries to Vietnam.

Jan. 26—Kissinger tells Congressmen that Congress will be consulted before the U.S. commits itself to any postwar aid programs for North Vietnam.

Jan. 31—At a news conference, President Nixon announces that Kissinger will go to Hanoi in February to try to strengthen the peace agreement. President Nixon also discloses that he plans to meet with President Thieu in California in the spring.

Government

Jan. 2—The resignation of Dr. Edward E. David, Jr., as science adviser to President Nixon is announced. Dr. David served as director of the White House Office of Science and Technology.

Jan. 3—It is announced that Gerard C. Smith, chief of the U.S. delegation to the Soviet-American talks on limiting strategic arms (SALT), has resigned.

The 93rd Congress convenes. Senator Mike Mansfield (D., Mont.) is reelected majority leader; Senator Hugh Scott (R., Pa.) is reelected minority leader. The House of Representatives reelects Carl Albert (D., Okla.) as speaker. Representative Thomas P. O'Neill, Jr. (D., Mass.) is chosen House majority leader. Representative Gerald R. Ford (R., Mich.) remains minority leader.

Jan. 5—Social Security Commissioner Robert M. Ball resigns.

President Nixon announces that as far as possible he is putting into effect by executive order the government reorganization plan he proposed in 1971, but which Congress failed to enact. The White House staff will be reduced from 4,000 to 2,000 persons. The core of the plan centers around the elevation of 3 Cabinet officers as White House counselors or "super-secretaries"; they will continue to hold their Cabinet titles. The three are Caspar W. Weinberger, Secretary-designate of Health, Education and Welfare; James T. Lynn, Secretary-designate of Housing and Urban Development; and Earl L. Butz, Secretary of Agriculture.

Jan. 6—At a joint session of Congress presided over by Vice President Spiro Agnew, the electoral college vote is counted and the official result of the November, 1972, presidential race is announced. President Nixon, the Republican candidate, received 520 electoral votes; Democratic nominee George McGovern received 17.

Jan. 8—The trial of the Watergate seven, who are charged with second-degree burglary and a conspiracy to bug and wiretap Democratic headquarters at the Watergate complex in Washington, D.C., in May and June, 1972, opens in the U.S. District Court for Washington, D.C.

Jan. 10—The chairman of the Federal Trade Commission, Miles W. Kirkpatrick, resigns.

The *New York Times* reports that Herbert W. Kalmbach, President Nixon's personal lawyer, has been identified in court depositions as a major solicitor for dairy-farm campaign contributions after the Nixon administration raised the price support level for milk.

Jan. 11—The Justice Department charges the Finance Committee to Reelect the President with 8 violations of federal law; it failed to record and report \$31,300 that it allegedly disbursed to one of the defendants in the Watergate trial.

E. Howard Hunt, Jr., a former White House consultant, pleads guilty to all 6 charges of conspiracy, burglary and eavesdropping in the trial of the Watergate seven.

Jan. 15—The Environmental Protection Agency formally proposes that auto travel in the Los Angeles basin be cut back some 80 per cent. The measure would be implemented by gas rationing. Under the Clean Air Act of 1970, the Los Angeles basin has until 1977 to comply with federal air quality standards. The proposal is considered the only way that compliance can be made certain.

Jan. 19—For the second day, testimony is given in the trial of Daniel Ellsberg and Anthony J. Russo, accused of 15 counts of conspiracy, theft and espionage for making public the top secret *Pentagon Papers*. (See *Current History*, February, 1972, p. 127.)

Jan. 20—President Richard M. Nixon and Vice President Spiro Agnew are inaugurated for their second terms. Anti-war demonstrators stage 3 demonstrations, the largest of which brought together 60,000 persons.

Jan. 23—In a proclamation, President Nixon announces officially the death yesterday of former President Lyndon B. Johnson; he appoints a national day of mourning on January 25.

After excusing the jury in the Watergate trial, U.S. District Court Chief Judge John J. Sirica questions Hugh W. Sloan, Jr., former treasurer of the Finance Committee to Reelect the President. Sloan reveals that a defendant in the case, G. Gordon Liddy, received \$199,000 in campaign funds from the Finance Committee to Reelect the President.

Jan. 26—U.S. District Court Judge William Matthew Byrne, Jr., declares that the U.S. government has secret studies showing that the publication of some of the *Pentagon Papers* did not affect the national defense; he is the presiding judge at the trial of Ellsberg and Russo.

Director of the Office of Management and Budget Roy L. Ash confirms that President Nixon will abolish the Office of Economic Opportunity; 3 smaller agencies—the Office of Emergency Preparedness, the Office of Science and Technology, and

the National Aeronautics and Space Council—will also be eliminated.

Jan. 28—In a taped radio address, President Nixon tells of plans to hold the federal budget to a ceiling of \$268.7 billion, and urges the American people to oppose increased government spending.

Jan. 29—In a message to Congress, President Nixon outlines his \$268.7-billion budget for fiscal year 1974 (beginning July 1, 1973) with over 100 cut-backs or terminations of government programs. The budget deficit will be cut to \$12.7 billion, half of the 1973 deficit. Defense spending will be increased by \$4.2 billion, to a total of \$79 billion.

The Senate confirms the nomination of Elliot L. Richardson as Secretary of Defense.

Jan. 30—James W. McCord, Jr., and G. Gordon Libby, 2 defendants in the Watergate trial, are found guilty by a jury of 8 women and 4 men.

Federal District Court Judge Byrne rules that the government must turn over evidence in its possession that helps prove the innocence of Ellsberg and Russo in the *Pentagon Papers* trial.

Jan. 31—Senator John C. Stennis (D., Miss.) is in "very serious condition" after being robbed and shot in front of his Washington, D.C., home last night.

Industry

Jan. 22—The General Motors Corporation recalls 3.7 million 1971 and 1972 cars to correct a safety defect that can cause the steering mechanism to jam.

Labor

Jan. 4—Arnold Miller, the new president of the United Mine Workers of America, announces salary cuts for himself and other officials.

Jan. 17—A 90-day cooling-off period in the 49-day-old Long Island Rail Road strike is announced; under the arrangement, workers will receive a 6 per cent wage increase retroactive to January 1, 1972. Service will resume at 12:01 A.M. on January 20.

Jan. 29—The U.M.W. international executive board revokes the lifetime pension of \$50,000 annually for former President W. A. Boyle.

Military

(See also *Intl, War in Vietnam*)

Jan. 3—It is reported that the Navy has granted an additional \$18-million loan to the Grumman Corporation despite Grumman's refusal to fill the first order of F-14 fighter planes at the agreed price.

Jan. 27—Defense Secretary Melvin R. Laird announces the end of the military draft.

Politics

Jan. 18—George Bush, former U.S. Representative to

the U.N., is unanimously elected the new chairman of the Republican National Committee.

Supreme Court

Jan. 22—The Supreme Court rules, 7 to 2, that state laws prohibiting or restricting a woman's right to an abortion during the first 3 months of pregnancy are unconstitutional. The right of privacy "is broad enough to encompass a woman's decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy." The state may regulate abortions during the last 6 months of pregnancy so as to protect maternal health. During the final 10 weeks of pregnancy, abortions may be proscribed except when the life of the mother is endangered. The state's interest in protecting potential life becomes legitimate when "the fetus has the capability" to live outside the womb.

VIETNAM, DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF (North)

Jan. 4—*The New York Times* reports that a survey in Vietnam estimates 1,318 North Vietnamese killed and 1,261 wounded during the 10 days of bombing that began December 18, 1972, over the Hanoi and Haiphong areas.

VIETNAM, REPUBLIC OF (South)

(See also *Intl, War in Indochina; U.S., Foreign Policy*)

Jan. 6—The official press agency, Vietnam Press, reports that President Nguyen Van Thieu has signed a decree authorizing the Interior Minister to approve the formation of all social, religious, educational, cultural and other voluntary associations and to supervise their activities.

YUGOSLAVIA

Jan. 11—Egypt's President Anwar Sadat arrives in Yugoslavia to talk with President Tito.

Jan. 18—The U.S. and Yugoslavia sign an agreement under which the U.S. will encourage capitalist investment in joint ventures in Yugoslavia.

ZAIRE

Jan. 28—President Mobutu Sese Seko announces that China has granted a \$100-million loan to his country.

ZAMBIA

(See also *Intl, U.N.; Rhodesia*)

Jan. 1—President Kenneth D. Kaunda orders the release of 35 members of the outlawed United Progressive party.

Jan. 11—The government announces that Zambia will no longer send her copper exports by the usual rail route through Rhodesia. Rhodesia closed the border with Zambia 2 days ago except for copper shipments.

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